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Abstract
Grant E. Muller
Optimal asset allocation and capital adequacy management
strategies for Basel III compliant banks
In this thesis we study a range of related commercial banking problems in discrete and con-
tinuous time settings. The rst problem is about a capital allocation strategy that optimizes
the expected future value of a commercial bank's total non-risk-weighted assets (TNRWAs)
in terms of terminal time utility maximization. This entails nding optimal amounts of
Total capital for investment in dierent bank assets. Based on the optimal capital allo-
cation strategy derived for the rst problem, we derive stochastic models for respectively
the bank's capital adequacy and liquidity ratios in the second and third problems. The
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) introduced these ratios in an attempt to
improve the regulation of the international banking industry in terms of capital adequacy
and liquidity management. As a fourth problem we derive a multi-period deposit insurance
pricing model which incorporates the optimal capital allocation strategy, the BCBS' latest
capital standard, capital forbearance and moral hazard. In the fth and nal problem we
show how the values of LIBOR-in-arrears and vanilla interest rate swaps, typically used by
commercial banks and other nancial institutions to reduce risk, can be derived under a spe-
cialized version of the ane interest rate model originally considered by the bank in question.
vii
 
 
 
 
More specically, in the rst problem we assume that the bank invests its Total capital in a
stochastic interest rate nancial market consisting of three assets, viz., a treasury security, a
marketable security and a loan. We assume that the interest rate in the market is described
by an ane model, and that the value of the loan follows a jump-diusion process. We
wish to nd the optimal capital allocation strategy that maximizes an expected logarithmic
utility of the bank's TNRWAs at a future date. Generally, analytical solutions to stochastic
optimal control problems in the jump setting are very dicult to obtain. We propose an
approximation method that exploits a similarity between the forms of the control problems
of the jump-diusion model and the diusion model obtained by removing the jump. With
the jump assumed suciently small, the analytical solution of the diusion model then serves
as a proxy to the solution of the control problem with the jump. In the second problem we
construct models for the bank's capital adequacy ratios in terms of the proxy. We present
numerical simulations to characterize the behaviour of the capital adequacy ratios. Fur-
thermore, in this chapter, we consider the approximate optimal capital allocation strategy
subject to a constant Leverage Ratio, which is a specic non-risk-based capital adequacy
ratio, at the minimum prescribed level. We derive a formula for the bank's TNRWAs at
constant (minimum) Leverage Ratio value and present numerical simulations based on the
modied TNRWAs formula. In the third problem we model the bank's liquidity ratios and
we monitor the levels of the liquidity ratios under the proxy numerically. In the fourth
problem we derive a multi-period deposit insurance pricing model, the latest capital stan-
dard a la Basel III, capital forbearance and moral hazard behaviour. The deposit insurance
pricing method utilizes an asset value reset rule comparable to the typical practice of insol-
vency resolution by insuring agencies. We perform numerical computations with our model
to study its implications. In the nal problem, we specialize the ane interest rate model
considered previously to the Cox-Ingersoll-Ross (CIR) interest rate dynamic. We consider
xed-for-oating interest rate swaps under the CIR model. We show how analytical expres-
sions for the values of both a LIBOR-in-arrears swap and a vanilla swap can be derived using
a Green's function approach. We employ Monte Carlo simulation methods to compute the
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values of the swaps for dierent scenarios.
We wish to make explicit the contributions of this project to the literature. A research arti-
cle titled \An Optimal Portfolio and Capital Management Strategy for Basel III Compliant
Commercial Banks" by Grant E. Muller and Peter J. Witbooi [1] has been published in an
accredited scientic journal. In the aforementioned paper we solve an optimal capital allo-
cation problem for diusion banking models. We propose using the solution of the Brownian
motions control problem of [1] as the proxy in problems two to four of this thesis. Further-
more, we wish to note that the methodology employed on the nal problem of this study
is actually from the paper [2] of Mallier and Alobaidi. In the paper [2] the authors did not
present simulation studies to characterize their pricing models. We contribute a simulation
study in which the values of the swaps are computed via Monte Carlo simulation methods.
References:
[1] G.E. Muller and P.J. Witbooi, \An optimal portfolio and capital management strategy
for Basel III compliant commercial banks", Journal of Applied Mathematics, vol. 2014, Ar-
ticle ID 723873, 11 pages, 2014. doi:10.1155/2014/723873
[2] R. Mallier and G. Alobaidi, \Interest rate swaps under CIR", Journal of Computational
and Applied Mathematics, 164-165, pp. 543-554, 2004.
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Chapter 1
Introduction and scope of the thesis
By law, commercial banks are authorized to receive money from their customers and lend
money to others. Commercial banks serve institutions and businesses and are also open to
the general public. They fulll many functions which include (1) receiving deposits from
depositors, (2) making payments upon the direction of its depositors, (3) collecting funds
from other banks payable to their customers, (4) investing funds in securities for a return,
(5) safeguarding money, (6) maintaining and servicing savings and checking accounts of
their depositors, (7) maintaining custodial accounts, i.e., accounts controlled by one person
but for the benet of another person and (8) lending money [42]. Due to these functions
of commercial banks, it is not dicult to see their importance to economies. Commercial
banks are corporations and are in business primarily to make a prot. However, due to their
importance to the economies, and because the element of public trust is so crucial to their
well-being, the regulation of the banking industry is very important. The Basel Committee
on Banking Supervision (BCBS) regulates the international banking industry on behalf of
governments [34, 94, 88, 53, 84, 86, 78].
In order for a commercial bank to make a prot, it must carefully manage its assets. This
involves two factors, viz., the amount of resources (capital invested, retained earnings and
deposits) it has available to invest, and its attitude towards risk and return. The bank must
1
 
 
 
 
decide how to allocate its resources optimally among its assets. An extremely useful tool to
the banking industry is the theory of optimization.
In nance dierent approaches to stochastic optimization, from a methodological point of
view, are exploited. A popular one is the stochastic control method. This method was used
for the rst time by Merton [70, 71]. The main feature of the stochastic optimal control
methodology is to solve the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) equation arising from dynamic
programming under the real-world probability measure [94, 78]. A second method was de-
veloped by Cox and Huang [23] in the setting of complete markets. It relies on the theory
of Lagrange multipliers. Also called the martingale method, this approach incorporates a
risk-neutral measure and generally involves solving a partial dierential equation (PDE) [94].
We will employ the stochastic optimal control approach in this study.
This thesis consists of two preliminary chapters and ve main chapters. In the rst pre-
liminary chapter, we present some general commercial banking theory. This chapter also
includes discussions on the regulation of the international banking industry, the importance
of deposit insurance funds to the banking system and the usefulness of interest rate swaps.
In the second preliminary chapter we cover all relevant mathematical ideas and concepts
used in this thesis. The main chapters, i.e., Chapters 5-9, focus on ve related commercial
banking problems. We will now give a breakdown of each of these problems.
In a continuous time setting, the rst problem involves deriving a capital allocation strategy
that optimizes the expected future value of a commercial bank's total non-risk-weighted as-
sets (TNRWAs) in terms of terminal time utility maximization. This entails nding optimal
amounts of Total capital for investment in dierent bank assets. In particular, we consider
a bank that invests its Total capital in a nancial market consisting of three assets, viz., a
treasury security, a marketable security and a loan. The dynamics of the loan is assumed to
be described by a jump-diusion process and we assume that the interest rate of the market
2
 
 
 
 
can be described by an ane model. We wish to nd the capital allocation strategy that
maximizes an expected logarithmic utility of the bank's TNRWAs at a future date. Gener-
ally analytical solutions to stochastic optimal control problems in the jump setting are very
dicult to obtain. We propose an approximation method that exploits a similarity between
the forms of the control problems of the jump-diusion model and the diusion model ob-
tained by removing the jump. With the jump assumed suciently small, the approximation
method replaces the jump-diusion model with a diusion model and solves the resulting
control problem analytically. The analytical solution then serves as a proxy to the solution
of the control problem with the jump.
In the second banking problem, which is also set in continuous time, we derive stochastic
dierential equations (SDEs) for the bank's capital adequacy ratios which incorporate the
proxy derived in the rst problem. The BCBS introduced these ratios in an attempt to
improve the regulation of the international banking industry in terms of capital adequacy
management. Since some of these ratios are computed from the total risk-weighted assets
(TRWAs) of the bank, we also derive an SDE for this quantity. We monitor the performance
of the capital adequacy ratios under the proxy numerically. In this chapter, we further con-
sider the approximate optimal capital allocation strategy subject to specically a constant
Leverage Ratio, which is regarded as a non-risk-based capital adequacy ratio, at the mini-
mum prescribed level. We derive a formula for the banks TNRWAs at constant (minimum)
Leverage Ratio value and present numerical simulations based on the modied TNRWAs
formula.
Still in continuous time, the third problem models the bank's liquidity ratios in terms of the
proxy. These ratios were introduced in an attempt to improve the regulation of the interna-
tional banking industry in terms of liquidity management. We simulate the behaviour of the
liquidity ratios under the proxy numerically. In order to derive the models of the liquidity
ratios, we require formulae for the Stock of High Quality Liquid Assets (SHQLAs), Total
3
 
 
 
 
Net Cash Outows (TNCOs) and the Available and Required Amounts of Stable Funding
(AASF and RASF). We also derive the SDEs describing these quantities here.
The fourth problem is set in a discrete time setting. In this problem we derive a multi-period
deposit insurance pricing model which incorporates the proxy, the BCBS' latest capital stan-
dard, capital forbearance and moral hazard. The deposit insurance pricing method utilizes
an asset value reset rule comparable to the typical practice of insolvency resolution by insur-
ing agencies. We perform numerical analyses with our model to study its implications. In
particular, we analyse the eect of the latest (Basel III) capital standard, capital forbearance
and moral hazard on the fairly-priced premium rate under dierent coverage horizons and
initial leverage (asset-to-debt) levels.
Lastly, in continuous time, we consider xed-for-oating interest rate swaps under the Cox-
Ingersoll-Ross or CIR [22] interest rate model, which is a special case of the ane model
considered previously. Commercial banks, such as the one modelled in this thesis, and other
nancial institutions typically use interest rate swaps to reduce risk. We show how analytical
expressions can be derived for the values of both a LIBOR-in-arrears interest rate swap and
a vanilla interest rate swap. To price the swaps, we take a contingent claims approach. This
means taking the common swap pricing approach of breaking each swap up into a series
of forward rate agreements (FRAs) and then pricing each FRA using the CIR [22] model
and a Green's function approach. The value of the swaps are then the sum of the values of
these FRAs. By contrast, market practice is that instruments such as swaps and FRAs are
commonly priced using a modication of the Black-Scholes formula, namely the Black-76
[13] formula. The Black-76 [13] formula was originally derived for commodities futures. In
the latter the interest rate follows a lognormal random walk rather than the mean-reverting
random walk CIR model. We wish to note that the methodology employed on this problem
is actually from the paper [65] of Mallier and Alobaidi. As our own contribution to the
analysis of this problem, we present numerical examples in which we compute the values of
4
 
 
 
 
the swaps for dierent scenarios with Monte Carlo simulation methods.
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Chapter 2
Basics of commercial banking
In this chapter we give an overview of the commercial banking concept. We also discuss
the regulation of banks, the importance of deposit insurance to the banking industry and
the usefulness of interest rate swaps. Firstly, we present the general commercial banking
model. In particular, we explain the balance sheet of commercial banks and dene the items
appearing thereon. These include the banks' assets, liabilities and capital. Secondly, we give
a background on the Basel Accords, which the BCBS introduced in an attempt to improve
the regulation of internationally active banks. Specically, we highlight the dierences and
improvements on the accords over one another, but our main focus will be the current set
of banking regulatory rules known as Basel III. We will present the discussions on deposit
insurance and interest rate swaps thereafter.
In this chapter, the main references on commercial banking and the regulation thereof are
the Basel documents [9, 10, 11, 12], the research articles [90, 92, 34, 76, 77, 53] and the book
Mukuddem-Petersen and Petersen [84]. We refer to the papers [29, 56, 58] and the reference
[19] when highlighting the importance of deposit insurance pricing, while we mainly reference
the paper Mallier and Alobaidi [65] when discussing swaps.
6
 
 
 
 
2.1 The commercial banking concept
To understand the operation and management of a commercial bank, for a practical problem
we study its stylized balance sheet, which records the assets (uses of funds) and liabilities
(sources of funds) of the bank.
The role of bank capital is to balance the assets and liabilities of the bank. A useful way,
for our analysis, of representing the balance sheet of the bank is as follows:
R + S + L = D +B + C; (2.1)
where R, S, L, D, B and C represent the values of reserves, securities, loans, deposits,
borrowings and capital respectively. Each of the variables above is regarded as a stochastic
process.
In order for a commercial bank to make a prot, it is important that the bank manages the
asset side of its balance sheet properly. The latter is determined by the amount of capital
and other resources (retained earnings and deposits) it has available to invest and the atti-
tude it has toward risk and return. The bank must therefore allocate its capital and other
resources optimally among its assets. Below we explain each of the items on the balance
sheet of a commercial bank.
The term reserves refer to the sum of the vault cash of the bank and the compulsory amount
of its money deposited at the central bank. The bank uses its vault cash to meet the day-
to-day currency withdrawals by its customers.
Securities consist of treasury securities (treasuries) and marketable securities. Treasuries
are bonds issued by national treasuries in most countries as a means of borrowing money to
meet government expenditures not covered by tax revenues, while marketable securities are
stocks and bonds that can be converted to cash quickly and easily.
7
 
 
 
 
The types of loans granted by the bank include business loans, mortgage loans (land loans)
and consumer loans. Consumer loans include credit extended by the bank for credit card
purchases. Mortgages are long term loans used to buy a house or land, where the house or
land acts as collateral. Business loans are taken out by rms that borrow funds to nance
their inventories, which act as collateral for the loan. A loan which has collateral (secured
loan) has a lower interest rate associated with it compared to a loan which has no collateral
(unsecured loan).
In order to raise bank capital, banks sell new equity, retain earnings and issue debt or build
up loan-loss reserves. It is usually the responsibility of a bank's risk management department
to calculate its capital requirements. Calculated risk capital is then approved by the bank's
top executive management. Furthermore, the structure of bank capital are proposed by the
Finance Department and subsequently approved by the bank's top executive management.
The dynamics of bank capital is stochastic in nature as it depends in part on the uncertainty
related to debt- and shareholder contributions. Further uncertainty are from the general
economic environment. In theory, the bank can decide on the rate at which debt and equity
is raised.
Under Basel III the banks' Total capital C has the form
C = CT1 + CT2;
where CT1 and CT2 are Tier 1 and Tier 2 capital respectively (see [10, 53] for instance). Tier
1 capital consists of the sum of Common Equity Tier 1 capital and Additional Tier 1 capital.
Common Equity Tier 1 capital is dened as the sum of the following elements [10]:
 Common shares issued by the bank that meet the criteria for classication as common
shares for regulatory purposes (or the equivalent for non-joint stock companies);
8
 
 
 
 
 Stock surplus (share premium) resulting from the issue of instruments included Com-
mon Equity Tier 1;
 Retained earnings;
 Accumulated other comprehensive income and other disclosed reserves;
 Common shares issued by consolidated subsidiaries of the bank and held by third
parties (i.e., minority interest) that meet the criteria for inclusion in Common Equity
Tier 1 capital;
 Regulatory adjustments applied in the calculation of Common Equity Tier 1.
The sum of the following elements make up the Additional Tier 1 capital [10]:
 Instruments issued by the bank that meet the criteria for inclusion in Additional Tier
1 capital (and are not included in Common Equity Tier 1);
 Stock surplus (share premium) resulting from the issue of instruments included in
Additional Tier 1 capital;
 Instruments issued by consolidated subsidiaries of the bank and held by third parties
that meet the criteria for inclusion in Additional Tier 1 capital and are not included
in Common Equity Tier 1;
 Regulatory adjustments applied in the calculation of Additional Tier 1 Capital.
Tier 2 capital consists of the sum of [10]
 Instruments issued by the bank that meet the criteria for inclusion in Tier 2 capital
(and are not included in Tier 1 capital);
 Stock surplus (share premium) resulting from the issue of instruments included in Tier
2 capital;
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 Instruments issued by consolidated subsidiaries of the bank and held by third parties
that meet the criteria for inclusion in Tier 2 capital and are not included in Tier 1
capital;
 Certain loan loss provisions;
 Regulatory adjustments applied in the calculation of Tier 2 Capital.
Deposits are considered to be the main liability of banks and refer to the money that the
banks' customers place in the banking institution for safekeeping. Deposits are made to
deposit accounts at a banking institution, such as savings accounts, checking accounts and
money market accounts. The holder of a deposit account has the right to withdraw any
deposited funds, as set forth in the terms and conditions of the account.
2.2 The regulation of the international banking indus-
try
The BCBS administers the regulation and supervision of the international banking indus-
try by imposing minimum capital requirements and other measures on the aforementioned
industry. The BCBS introduced the Basel Accords which provide recommendations on in-
ternational banking regulations in regard to market risk, capital risk and operational risk.
The purpose of the Basel Accords is to ensure that internationally active banks hold enough
capital to meet obligations and to absorb unexpected losses [2].
In 1988 the BCBS issued the 1988 Basel Capital Accord also known as the Basel I Accord.
With Basel I the BCBS aimed to assess the banks' capital in relation to its credit risk, or the
risk of a loss occurring if a party does not full its obligations. Basel I resulted in the trend
toward increasing risk modelling research by creating a bank asset classication system that
grouped banks' assets into the following risk categories [1]:
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 0% - cash, central bank and government debt and any Organization for Economic
Co-operation and Development (OECD) government debt;
 0%, 10%, 20% or 50% - public sector debt;
 20% - development bank debt, OECD bank debt, OECD securities rm debt, non-
OECD bank debt (under one year maturity) and non-OECD public sector debt, cash
in collection;
 50% - residential mortgages;
 100% - private sector debt, non-OECD bank debt (maturity over a year), real estate,
plant and equipment, capital instruments issued at other banks.
Banks were to maintain Total capital (calculated as the sum of Tier 1 and Tier 2 capital)
equal to at least 8% of its total-risk-weighted assets under Basel I [1]. However, Basel I was
based on simplied calculations and classications, which have simultaneously called for its
disappearance. As a result the BCBS introduced the Basel II Capital Accord and further
agreements as the symbol of the continuous renement of risk and capital [97].
With the 2004 (revised) framework of the Basel II Capital Accord (see [9]), the BCBS layed
down regulations seeking to provide incentives for greater awareness of dierences in risk
through more risk-sensitive minimum capital requirements based on numerical formulas.
The capital adequacy ratios (see for instance [90, 92, 34, 76, 77]) measure the amount of
the bank's capital relative to its amount of credit exposures. Internationally, a standard
has been adopted that requires banks to adhere to minimum levels of capital requirements.
Banks complying with minimum capital requirements are guaranteed the ability to absorb
reasonable levels of losses before becoming insolvent. Thus, capital adequacy ratios ensure
the safety and stability of the banking system.
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Mathematically, capital adequacy ratios are dened as
Capital Adequacy Ratio =
Indicator of Absolute Amount of Bank Capital
Indicator of Absolute Level of Bank Risk
:
The bank or the regulator can use this equation to determine whether an absolute amount
of bank capital is adequate when compared to a measure of absolute risk [34].
According to the Federal Insurance Deposit Corporation (FDIC), capital adequacy ratios can
be divided into risk-based capital adequacy ratios and non-risk-based capital adequacy ratios
[34]. Examples of risk-based capital adequacy ratios can be the Total Capital Ratio and
Tier 1 Ratio [9, 34]. The Total Capital Ratio or CAR is a comparison between banks' Total
capital and total risk-weighted assets (TRWAs), where TRWAs are constituted by the capital
charges for credit, market and operational risk. Similarly, the Tier 1 Ratio is a comparison
between the banks' Tier 1 capital and TRWAs. Under Basel II banks were considered to be
adequately capitalized if they maintained a CAR of at least 8% and a Tier 1 Ratio of at
least 4%. An example of the non-risk-based capital adequacy ratios can be the Equity Ratio,
which compares banks' Equity capital to its TNRWAs. Under Basel II it was recommended
that banks maintain a minimum Equity Ratio of 2%.
In 2010, the BCBS released the Basel III Accord. Globally, Basel III is the latest regulatory
standard on bank capital adequacy, stress testing and market liquidity risk. Basel III is more
stringent than the Basel I and II Accords and has two main objectives [10, 11, 12, 53, 84]:
 To strengthen global regulation of capital and liquidity with the goal of promoting a
more resilient banking sector;
 To improve the banking sector's ability to absorb shocks arising from the nancial and
economic stress.
The enhancements of Basel III over Basel II come primarily in the following areas: (i) aug-
mentation in the level and quantity of capital; (ii) introduction of a leverage ratio; and (iii)
12
 
 
 
 
introduction of liquidity standards [10, 11, 12, 53, 84]. We discuss these enhancements below.
Basel III contains various measures aimed at improving the quantity and quality of capital.
In this regard, the ultimate aim of Basel III is to improve the loss-absorption capacity in
both going concerns and liquidation scenarios. Basel III proposes that banks retain the min-
imum CAR of 8% while the minimum Tier 1 Ratio should be increased to 6%. The equity
component of the latter is stipulated at 4.5% under Basel III. Basel III introduced the new
concepts of capital conversion buer and countercyclical capital buer (CCB). Generally the
term \countercyclical" is used when there is a negative correlation between an economic
quantity and the overall state of the economy. The capital conversion buer ensures that
banks are able to absorb losses without breaching the minimum capital requirement, and
are able to carry on business even in a downturn without deleveraging. This does not form
part of the regulatory minimum. Thus while the 8% minimum capital requirement remains
unchanged under Basel III, there is now an added 2.5% as capital cushion buer. The CCB
is a pre-emptive measure that requires banks to build up capital gradually as imbalances in
the credit market develop. The CCB may be in the range of 0-2.5% of TRWAs which could
be imposed on banks during periods of excess credit growth. There is also a provision for a
higher capital surcharge on systemically important banks. Basel III strengthens the coun-
terparty credit risk framework in market risk instruments. This includes the use of stressed
input parameters to determine the capital requirement for counterparty credit default risk.
Basel III introduced a new capital requirement known as credit valuation adjustment risk
capital charge for over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives. Its purpose is to protect banks against
the risk of decline in the credit quality of the counterparty [10, 53, 84].
Basel III's new Leverage Ratio can be considered as another example of non-risk-based cap-
ital adequacy ratios. It acts as a non-risk-sensitive backstop measure to reduce the risk of a
buildup of excessive leverage at the institution level and in the nancial system as a whole.
The Leverage Ratio requirement would hence set an all-encompassing oor to minimum cap-
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ital requirements. This would limit the potential erosive eects of gaming and model risk on
capital against true risks. Basel III recommends a 3% minimum Leverage Ratio [10, 53, 84].
The Leverage Ratio is dened as the comparison between banks' Tier 1 capital and TNRWAs
[10, 83].
With the aim of further strengthening the liquidity framework the BCBS developed two min-
imum standards for quantifying funding liquidity. These are the Liquidity Coverage Ratio
or LCR and Net Stable Funding Ratio or NSRF. The LCR standard aims at a bank having
an adequate SHQLAs (recall, the Stock of High Quality Liquid Assets). SHQLAs consist of
cash or assets that can be converted into cash at little or no loss of value in private markets to
meet its liquidity requirements in a 30 calendar day liquidity stress scenario. The LCR con-
sists of the two components SHQLAs and the TNCOs (recall, the Total Net Cash Outows)
over the next 30 calendar days. By design the NSRF encourages and incentivises banks to
use stable sources to fund their activities. The NSRF aids in reducing the dependence on
short term wholesale funding during times of buoyant market liquidity while it encourages
better assessment of liquidity risk across all on- and o-balance sheet items. NSFR requires
a minimum amount of stable sources of funding at a bank relative to the liquidity proles
of the assets, as well as the potential for contingent liquidity needs arising from o-balance
sheet commitments, over a one-year horizon. The implications here would pertain to the type
of current short term markets available for banks to provide liquidity, the type of long term
markets needed, the cost of deposit, and the impact on the protability of banks. One issue
with reference to liquidity is how the regulator would consider the Statutory Liquidity Ratio
(SLR) securities. The SLR is dened as the amount that commercial banks are required to
maintain in the form of cash, or gold or government approved securities before providing
credit to their customers. Banks are already investing a substantial amount (around 25%)
of their deposits in the SLR securities. The relevance of the cash reserve ratio has also come
into question. All these have implementation implications for deposit pricing, cost of funds,
and protability [53].
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The LCR is calculated as the ratio between SHQLAs and TNCOs over a 30-day stress
period. The Basel III framework requires the LCR to be above or equal to 100%. SHQLAs
are calculated as the market value of assets multiplied by an asset factor for individual levels
of assets. A mathematical expression for the LCR is
Liquidity Coverage Ratio =
Stock of High Quality Assets
Total Net Cash Outows
:
The quantity TNCOs in the denominator of the above equation is dened as the total ex-
pected cash outows minus total expected cash inows in the specied stress scenario for
the subsequent 30 calendar days. Total expected cash outows are calculated by multiplying
the outstanding balances of various categories or types of liabilities and o-balance sheet
commitments by the rates at which they are expected to run o or be drawn down. Total
expected cash inows are calculated by multiplying the outstanding balances of various cat-
egories of contractual receivables by the rates at which they are expected to ow in under
the scenario up to an aggregate cap of 75% of total expected cash outows (see [11]). The
formula for calculating TNCOs is [11]
Total Net Cash Outows = total expected cash outows
  Min(total expected cash inows; 75% of total
expected cash outows):
The NSFR requires a minimum amount of stable sources of funding at a bank relative to
the liquidity of the assets and the potential for contingent liquidity needs from o-balance
sheet activities over a one-year horizon. The aim of this ratio is to promote medium to long
term resiliency [12]. The NSFR is calculated as
Net Stable Funding Ratio =
Available Amount of Stable Funding
Required Amount of Stable Funding
;
and this ratio is also required to be equal to at least 100%. The RASF or Required Amount of
Stable Funding depends solely on the characteristics of the respective instrument's liquidity,
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which in turn determine the Available Stable Factor (ASF) or Required Stable Factor (RSF).
ASF factors dene the amount of assets that would be expected to stay with the bank for
an extended period in an idiosyncratic stress event. RSF factors approximate the amount of
a particular asset that could not be monetised during a liquidity event lasting one year.
2.3 The importance of deposit insurance to banks
Deposit insurance funds (DIFs) are a form of protection to depositors of banks against risk
of loss arising from failure of banks and other depository institutions. DIFs are usually
provided by a government agency. Deposit insurance is mandatory. It claims from a pool
of funds to which every depository institution regularly contributes. Deposit insurance only
covers a xed maximum amount per depositor or deposit account holder.
Deposit account holders at banks certainly feel more secure if their deposits are insured.
This feeling of security reduces the type of fear that has caused bank runs in the 1930s. The
DIF number of a bank is commonly used to compare the value of its TNRWAs to those of
problematic banks appearing on the FDIC's quarterly issued \Problem Banks List". Since
the FDIC could borrow from the Treasury Department it could not run out of funds. How-
ever, large losses would mean increased premiums for the remaining banks in the years to
come.
A country's DIF can be either an explicit deposit insurance fund (EDIF) or an implicit deposit
insurance fund (IDIF). It has been argued that EDIF coverages are contractual obligations
while IDIF coverages are only conjectural. IDIF coverage exist to the extent that political
incentives which inuence a government's reaction to large or widespread banking problems
make taxpayer bailouts of insolvent banks seem inevitable. Banking crises pressurize gov-
ernments to rescue at least some banks. This amounts to a sort of implicit deposit insurance
being applicable in every country. Despite some dierences between EDIFs and IDIFs, both
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aim to protect depositors and enhance the stability of the nancial system [19].
Under IDIFs, the government's protection of depositors is discretionary [39]. IDIFs do not
have any formal laws or regulations relating to the compensation of depositors in the event of
a bank failure. The reimbursement amount and the form of protection is based on an ad hoc
decision solely made by the government and is responsible for the nancing of depositors.
Under an IDIF system the government can make payments directly to depositors. Alterna-
tively the government could either arrange for the failed bank's deposits to be assumed by
another bank, or arrange and facilitate the merger of a problem bank with a healthy bank,
or bail out the troubled bank through direct capital injection. IDIFs have drawbacks in
that they create uncertainty about how and when depositors will be compensated. Funding
depends on a government's ability to access funds after a bank failure. As a result, in some
countries depositors have not been reimbursed at all [19].
EDIFs, on the other hand, have laws that provide for bank deposit guarantees and establish
basic aspects of the deposit insurance system. Such basics are coverage limits, if and how
the system will be funded, how depositors are to be paid in the event of a bank failure, types
of institutions and deposits eligible for protection and whether membership is voluntary or
compulsory. EDIFs, normally created by an Act of Parliament, can have 100% or limited
depositor coverage. The latter is currently more popular than IDIFs. When a country
adopts an EDIF it does not mean that implicit guarantees by government are eliminated,
especially during a systemic crisis. They can be privately or publicly administered. Its
merits are that it helps the governments to meet its obligations to depositors, limits the
scope for discretionary decisions and enhances public condence, enhances nancial stability
by establishing a framework for the resolution of failing or failed banks and help to contain
the costs of resolving bank failures [19]. It also has its drawbacks, on which we dwell below
[19]:
 During a nancial crisis limited coverage deposit protection will not prevent bank runs;
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 Moral hazard-explicitly protected depositors may have less incentives to monitor their
banks;
 When depositors are protected banks have more incentive to take excessive risks.
According to Duan and Yu [29] the majority of defaulting banks continue to operate with
deposit insurance after reorganization. These banks can be regarded as receiving an at-the-
money put option at the point of insolvency resolution. In light of this, deposit insurance
can be viewed as a stream of one-period Merton-type put options with occasional TNRWAs
value resets. Banks are assumed to pay out cash dividends whenever the value of their TNR-
WAs exceeds the level required by a threshold asset-to-debt ratio. The asset-to-debt ratio
is regarded as the maximum level of paid-in capital above which the bank's equity holders
would consider to be excessive and start distributing cash dividends. The threshold level is
dictated by the dividend policy of the bank [29].
The insuring agent levies a premium rate which is assumed to be constant over a particular
coverage horizon. The xed premium rate coverage horizon can be one year or several years.
Charging a xed premium rate over a period of several years is, in reality, standard practice
of most insuring agents. A fairly-priced deposit insurance premium rate can be determined
by equating the present value of premium proceeds to that of the puts until the terminal
point of the coverage horizon. The risk-neutral valuation technique can be used to price the
stream of one-period Merton-type put options. A closed-form solution can not be derived,
but the present value can be computed by means of Monte Carlo simulation methods [29].
According to [29] the Federal Savings and Loan Deposit Insurance Corporation and the
FDIC allowed the troubled depository institutions to remain open. They believed that these
institutions were suering temporary nancial setbacks and would later return to sound
nancial conditions. According to the paper [8] of Bartholomew, the thrift regulator took an
average of 38 months to close and resolve the failed savings and loans institutions over the
period 1980-1990. Kane [56] and Kaufman [58] criticized this practice of capital forbearance.
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The aforementioned authors argue that capital forbearance encourages \zombie" institutions
to engage in excessive risk-taking. Capital forbearance eectively postpones recognizing and
realizing losses in a multi-period setting. The postponement of a timely closure simply
substitutes an immediate cash settlement with future liabilities. Without excessive risk-
taking by troubled institutions, it is not clear whether capital forbearance is a bad practice.
2.4 The usefulness of interest rate swaps to the bank-
ing industry
An interest rate swap or swap contract is an agreement between two parties, known as coun-
terparties, to exchange a series of cash ows according to some pre-specied terms. Swap
contracts are OTC, meaning that they are private arrangements. They can be directly be-
tween two parties or facilitated by a swap dealer, rather than exchange-traded. The cash
ows are usually based on some underlying asset, such as an exchange rate, an interest rate,
a commodity price, an equity, etc. [65]
In interest rate swaps, the two parties exchange cash ows that constitute the interest on
a notional principal. The term \notional principal" refers to the value of the underlying
asset on which the cash ows are based. The notional principal is relevant for determining
contingent liabilities and capital market requirements. Typically, only the cash ows are
exchanged in such a swap, not the principal. An example of such an interest rate swap can
be a vanilla interest rate swap, or a xed-for-oating swap. In such a swap one party agrees
to pay the other a xed interest rate and receives a oating rate [65].
In swaps that are arranged by a swap dealer, the dealer typically charges a fee for arranging
the swap. The fee could be either in the form of an up-front fee, or more usually in the
form of a spread on the interest payment. Hull [47] estimates the spread at 3-4 basis points
or 0.03-0.04% per annum. A major advantage of a swap directly between the end-users is
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that the costs involved are less. However, not every institution has the resources to arrange
a swap without using a dealer. Typically, when a swap dealer is involved, the swap will
consist of two separate contracts between the dealer and the two parties. The dealer often
warehouses a swap. That is, the dealer enters into one side of the swap without having found
a counterparty for the other side of the swap. The advantages of using a dealer are rstly
that it makes a swap easier to arrange. Secondly, the dealer assumes the credit and default
risk. This means that even if one party defaults, the dealer will honour his/her agreement
with the other party, and the spread earned by the dealer is partly as compensation for
assuming this risk: typically, the fee charged to a swap participant by the dealer will depend
upon the credit rating of the participant, with low credit ratings meaning higher fees and
vice versa. For swaps arranged without a dealer, a dierence between the credit ratings of
the two counterparties would typically be reected in the xed interest rate [65]
One of the most common oating rates used in an interest rate swap agreement is London
Interbank Oer Rate (LIBOR). It is considered as a benchmark rate that some of the world's
leading banks charge each other for short-term loans. Interest rate swaps are typically used
to reduce risk by institutions whose assets and liabilities have a dierent structure, such as a
bank having assets in the form of xed rate mortgages but short-term liabilities in the form
of deposits on which a competitive rate of interest must be paid to attract depositors [65].
Typically, the other party is more interested in increasing prot potential and is willing to
take on added risk by swapping a xed rate interest stream for one that is variable. Both
parties benet by better matching nancial positions to bank needs.
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Chapter 3
Literature review
We now briey discuss the works of some of the authors who have contributed to the study
and analysis of optimal asset allocation and capital adequacy management problems of com-
mercial banks under the Basel II and III regimes. We also discuss some research papers on
the modelling and analyses of Basel III's new liquidity ratios. After these discussions, we
summarize the works of some of the authors who have developed deposit insurance pricing
models. Finally, we discuss research articles on the pricing of interest rate swaps.
3.1 The increasing popularity of optimization theory
under Basel II
We now describe how the popularity of the application of optimization theory in commercial
banking problems under the Basel II regime came about. In addition, we describe some
examples of optimization problems that were studied in Basel II settings. The latter include
the optimization problems of the papers Mukuddem-Petersen and Petersen [75], Fouche et
al. [34], Mulaudzi et al. [77], Mukuddem-Petersen and Petersen [76] and Witbooi et al. [94].
Theoretical evidence on the Basel I Accord suggests that the revised version of the Accord
may have had an inuence on the structure of commercial banks' balance sheets. According
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to Berger and Udell [14], for instance, Basel I assigned higher risk weights to commercial
loans than securities, where the risk-based capital requirements operates as a regulatory tax.
As a result there was a reduction in protability of commercial loans relative to securities.
This of course allowed banks to reallocate their funds to other assets. Further evidence sup-
porting this theory is Jones [54], who undertook regulatory capital arbitrage as in incentive
to adjust their on and o balance sheet activities to the Basel I capital requirements. In addi-
tion, the empirical evidence by Hall [43], Haubrich and Wachtel [46], Brinkmann and Horvitz
[17], Thakor [90] and Furne [36, 37], provided more clues as to how the revised risk-based
capital requirements may have had signicant impact on commercial bank balance sheets.
The aforementioned authors found that the risk-based capital requirements indeed caused
a reduction in bank lending. They concluded that the risk-based capital requirements may
have been one of the factors responsible for the credit crunch in the early 90's, where banks
decreased their investments in commercial lending and simultaneously shifted their funding
towards government securities. Furthermore, authors such as Haubrich and Wachtel [46],
Keeton [59] and Jacques and Nigro [51] observed that capital-constraint banks responded to
the revised requirements by shifting away from high risk-weighted assets, such as commercial
loans, and towards low risk-weighted assets such as government securities.
The rise of Basel II saw an increase in the popularity of the application of optimization
theory in banking optimization problems. Classes of optimization problems encountered in
the banking literature are on the optimal management of bank asset portfolios and capital
adequacy. These generally involve bank asset portfolio diversication as was taking place
under the revised Basel Accord. The most common optimization technique used in this
eld is the method of stochastic optimal control. As stated earlier, this method is gener-
ally a tedious one to apply, as it involves solving the HJB equation arising from dynamic
programming under the real world probability measure. Examples of the application of the
aforementioned methodology in optimal bank asset and capital management problems in
banking can for instance be observed in the work of Mukuddem-Petersen and Petersen [75],
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Fouche et al. [34], Mulaudzi et al. [77] and Mukuddem-Petersen and Petersen [76]. Another
method called the Martingale methodology was used, to our knowledge, for the rst time in
an optimal asset and capital management problem in banking by Witbooi et al. [94]. The
martingale method relies on the theory of Lagrange multipliers and involves solving a PDE
under a risk-neutral measure.
The paper [75] studies a banking problem related to the optimal risk management of banks
in a stochastic dynamic setting. The authors of paper [75] particularly minimize market and
capital adequacy risk. These respectively involve the safety of the securities held and the
stability of sources of funds. In this regard, Mukuddem-Petersen and Petersen [75] suggest
an optimal portfolio choice and rate of bank capital inow that will keep the loan level
as close as possible to an actuarially determined reference process. This set-up leads to a
non-linear stochastic optimal control problem whose solution may be determined by means
of the dynamic programming algorithm. The analysis of Mukuddem-Petersen and Petersen
[75] relies on the construction of continuous-time stochastic models for bank behaviour upon
which a spread method for loan capitalization is imposed. The main novelty of paper [75]
is the solution of an optimal stochastic control problem that minimizes bank market and
capital adequacy risks by making choices about security allocation and capital requirements,
respectively. The former is measured by the deviations of the banks securities from the loan
issuing process and is an indicator of the bank's safety. The latter provides information
about the size of the deviation of bank capital requirements from the bank capital reference
process and is related to the nancial stability of the bank.
In their paper [34], Fouche et al. model non-risk-based and risk-based capital adequacy
ratios. More specically, the authors of [34] construct continuous-time stochastic models
for the dynamics of the Leverage, Equity and Tier 1 ratios with the aim of deriving the
CAR. The aforementioned authors show how their result is relevant to the banking sector by
studying an optimal control problem in which an optimal asset allocation strategy is derived
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for the Leverage Ratio on a given time interval. In particular, Fouche et al. [34] determine
the optimal expected terminal utility of the Leverage Ratio and derive the asset allocation
strategy that makes it possible to maximize the expected terminal utility of the Leverage
Ratio on the given time interval.
Mulaudzi et al. [77] investigate the investment of bank funds in loans and treasuries with
the aim of generating an optimal nal fund level. The study of [77] considers a bank that
takes behavioural aspects such as risk and regret into account. Regret is the disutility a bank
experiences from the gap in value between an actual asset return and the best possible return
that the bank could have attained in a particular economic state. Mulaudzi et al. [77] apply
a branch of optimization theory that enables them to consider a regret attribute alongside
a risk component as an integral part of the utility function. In this case, regret-aversion
corresponds to the convexity of the regret function and the bank's preference is assumed
to be representable by optimization subject to the utility. Furthermore, they compare risk-
and regret-averse banks in terms of optimal asset allocation between loans and treasuries.
One of their main results implies that banks with regret-averse attributes will select opti-
mal asset allocations that are less extreme than those predicted by conventional expected
utility. In the case of a very risky portfolio being selected by a purely risk-averse bank, its
regret-averse counterpart would select a less risky portfolio. Conversely, should the purely
risk-averse bank choose a non-risky portfolio, the regret-averse bank would prefer a riskier
portfolio. In essence, banks that are regret-averse will tend to hedge their bets, taking into
account the possibility that their preferences may turn out to be suboptimal after the expiry
of the loan period. The paper [77] also relates the aforementioned conclusions to the credit
crunch phenomenon.
Mukuddem-Petersen and Petersen [76] consider the application of stochastic optimization
theory to asset portfolio and capital adequacy management in banking. Their study is largely
motivated by the Basel II banking regulation that emphasizes risk minimization practices
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associated with assets and capital. The analysis of [76] depends on the dynamics of the CAR
which they compute in a stochastic setting, by dividing regulatory capital (RC) by the credit
risk charge. By denition, RC is the amount of risk capital held by banks and other nan-
cial institutions which enable them to survive diculties such as market or credit risk. This
amount is determined by legislation or the regulator. Mukuddem-Petersen and Petersen [76]
further demonstrate how the CAR can be optimized in terms of bank equity allocation and
the rate at which additional debt and equity is raised. In their analysis, Mukuddem-Petersen
and Petersen [76] employ the dynamic programming algorithm for stochastic optimization.
Moreover, the authors of [76] contribute to the debate about a major shortcoming of the
Basel II regulation associated with reference processes for capital adequacy ratios. Their
analysis includes an illustration of aspects of bank management practice in relation to this
regulation. Another feature of the paper Mukuddem-Petersen and Petersen [76] is that the
authors consider historical data from OECD countries in order to characterize the cyclicality
of capital ratios.
In the paper Witbooi et al. [94], the authors apply the Cox-Huang methodology in a
continuous-time banking problem where the term structure of the interest rate is ane. The
problem addressed in paper [94] particularly involves obtaining an optimal capital allocation
strategy that optimizes the bank's TNRWAs consisting of three assets namely a treasury, a
marketable security and a loan. The optimal capital allocation strategy is derived by con-
structing SDEs for the dynamics of the assets in the nancial market, the dynamics of the
TNRWAs of the bank and developing an allocation strategy that maximizes the TNRWAs
of the bank by means of power utility maximization. At the same time, the authors of [94]
derive an explicit SDE for the dynamics of the CAR which is calculated by dividing the
Total bank capital by the TRWAs. Witbooi et al. [94] observe the behaviour of the CAR
under the diversication of the bank's TNRWAs. Their main result is a numerical simulation
study in which their CAR resembles a mean-reverting process whose level prevails above the
required minimum level of 8%.
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3.2 Analyses of Basel III related commercial banking
problems
This section presents a summary of commercial banking problems studied under Basel III.
In particular, we discuss the works of Muller and Witbooi [78], Jarrow [52], Petersen et al.
[83], Gideon et al. [40], De Waal et al. [27] and King [60] here.
To the best of our knowledge, the research article by Muller and Witbooi [78] on optimal
capital allocation and capital adequacy management strategies of commercial banks, is cur-
rently the only paper in the literature to address these issues in a Basel III setting. The
paper [78] models the CAR in terms of optimal capital allocation. In particular, Muller and
Witbooi [78] present a model for a bank's CAR in terms of the optimal capital allocation
strategy which maximizes an expected logarithmic utility of the bank's TNRWAs at a future
date. Furthermore, the paper [78] derives a modied version of the formula for the bank's
TNRWAs corresponding to a constant CAR at the 8% level. It presents simulations of the
performances of the CAR and modied TNRWAs. For the set of simulation parameters
considered, the CAR value persists above the 8% level for the entire investment horizon con-
sidered, while the value of the modied TNRWAs is improved if the CAR is at its constant
minimal value.
The paper [52] of Jarrow studies the economic foundations for maximum Leverage Ratio
rules. In paper [52], Jarrow makes three contributions to the banking literature. First, the
author shows how to determine the maximum Leverage Ratio such that the probability of in-
solvency is less than some predetermined quantity. Secondly, he shows that as an alternative
to Value-at-Risk (VaR) rules, Leverage Ratio rules can also be used as a tool for controlling
insolvency risk. Lastly, Jarrow [52] argues that Leverage Ratio rules are better than VaR
rules because they are more intuitive and easier to compare across rms.
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In the paper [83], Petersen et al. study the new Basel III Leverage Ratio. The paper [83]
makes use of BankScope data to study internationally active Class I banks that have Tier
1 capital and TNRWAs in excess of US $4 and 100 billion respectively. The authors of [83]
also consider Class II banks which do not satisfy the aforementioned conditions. Their study
reveals the following. Under both Basel II and Basel III regimes Class I banks are more
leveraged than Class II banks. A larger proportion of TNRWAs are made up of o-balance
sheet items for Class I banks than for their Class II counterparts. Both types of banks are
more leveraged under Basel III leverage calculations than under the Basel II dispensation.
It appears that in isolation, high Basel leverage does not appear to be a reliable predictor of
subsequent bank distress [83]. An increase in regulation restrictiveness from Basel II to Basel
III will however signicantly inuence leverage. More restrictive regulation is particularly
associated with relatively higher leverage. Basel III has to adopt a more than one-size-ts-all
approach with respect to leverage.
Gideon et al. [40] provide a framework for the liquidity management of banks. The authors
of [40] provide a description for the Inverse Net Stable Funding Ratio (INSFR) dynamics
which promote resilience over a longer time horizon by creating additional incentives with
more stable funding sources. The paper [40] also makes a clear connection between liq-
uidity and nancial crises in a numerical-quantitative frameworks. In addition, Gideon et
al. [40] derive a stochastic model for the dynamics of the INSFR that depends mainly on
required stable funding, available stable funding as well as the liquidity provisioning rate.
Furthermore, the authors of the paper [40] obtain an analytic solution to an optimal bank
INSFR problem with a quadratic objective function. This solution can in principle assist in
the management of the INSFRs of banks. Liquidity provisioning and bank asset allocation
are expressed in terms of a reference process here. Furthermore, Gideon et al. [40] provide
a numerical example in order to describe the interplay between the amount of net stable
funding and liquidity demands. Gideon et al. [40] nd that the INSFR has some limitations
regarding the characterization of banks' liquidity positions. For a more complete analysis
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complementary Basel III ratios such as the NSFR should be considered. According to [40]
the latter should take the structure of the short-term assets and liabilities of residual matu-
rities into account.
In the research article [27], De Waal et al. study a numerical problem based on the new
Basel III liquidity regulation. More specically, De Waal et al. [27] explore the relationships
between Shareholder Cash Flow Rights (SCFR), i.e., shareholders' claims on cash payouts
or dividends, and capital stability and liquidity via the NSFR and LCR, respectively. Their
results suggest that, as SCFR concentration rises, banks liquidity increases in a statistically
and economically signicant manner. Furthermore, De Waal et al. [27] hypothetically ex-
plore the impact of Basel III via the NSFR for sample banks. The evidence suggests that
capital stability will be related to SCFR concentration. At lower levels of SCFR concentra-
tion, concentrated SCFR diminishes capital stability. On the other hand, at higher levels,
concentrated SCFR enhances capital stability. Their results provide insights into how Basel
III liquidity regulation might be applied in future.
King [60] presents the rst comprehensive assessment of the NSFR. The paper [60] out-
lines how the NSFR is calculated and estimates the ratio for the representative bank in 15
countries. For banks that are below the minimum threshold, King [60] examines dierent
strategies to meet the NSFR and estimates the impact of these changes on bank net interest
margins (NIMs). NIMs measure the dierence between the interest income generated by
banks and other nancial institutions and the amount of interest paid out to their lenders
relative to the amount of their (interest-earning) assets. King [60] highlights the trade-os
between liquidity regulation, bank risk and protability. The NSFR is designed to encourage
banks to hold more high-quality, unencumbered, liquid assets and to increase funding from
stable sources such as deposits, longer maturity debt, and equity. These changes should
increase the resilience of banks during stressful periods. De-risking the bank in this way
should bring some benets, such as increasing capital ratios, lowering the cost of capital and
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increasing charter value. The tradeo, however, is lower protability during normal times.
Holding fewer illiquid assets and more high-quality assets that cannot be pledged as collat-
eral will lower interest income. Funding assets with longer maturity liabilities will increase
interest expense. The resulting decline in net interest income combined with the increase in
interest earning assets will cause NIMs to decline. Bank submissions to the BCBS suggest
the liquidity requirements may dramatically and adversely impact bank business models and
protability. Concerned about potential unintended consequences, regulators have delayed
implementation of the LCR until 2015 and the NSFR until 2018.
3.3 Deposit insurance pricing via put options
Below we summarize the contributions of Merton [72, 73], Marcus and Shaked [68], McCul-
loch [69], Ronn and Verma [85], Pennacchi [82] and Duan et al. [28], Allen and Saunders
[6], and Duan and Yu [29, 30]. All of the aforementioned authors have modelled deposit
insurance as some form of put option.
Merton [72] rst suggested an analogy between deposit insurance and a put option to value
deposit insurance contracts. Since Merton's analogy, there has been a tradition of mod-
elling deposit insurance as a one-period European put option. Examples in the literature of
modelling deposit insurance in this way can for instance be observed in the research papers
Merton [73], Marcus and Shaked [68], McCulloch [69], Ronn and Verma [85], Pennacchi [82]
and Duan et al. [28]. The aforementioned authors derived the formula for the put option
under the assumption that, at the time of the audit, which could be either deterministic or
stochastic, the put option is exercised if the insured institution is found to be insolvent. The
deposit insuring agent renegotiates the terms for the next period if the insured institution is
solvent.
Allen and Saunders [6] were the rst to depart from the tradition of modelling deposit in-
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surance in this way. They argue that deposit insurance can be described as a callable put in
the sense that deposit insurance is a perpetual put option with the insuring agent holding
the right to terminate the put prematurely. In the paper [29] of Duan and Yu, the authors
propose an alternative way of interpreting deposit insurance in a multi-period framework.
The defaulting banks in the model of Duan and Yu [29] are assumed to have their assets
reset to the level of the outstanding deposits plus accrued interests when an insolvency
resolution takes place. According to the deposit insurance contract, the amount required
to reset the assets is the legal liability of the insuring agent. Historical data on deposit
insurance from the U.S. supports this set-up. The majority of defaulting depository insti-
tutions were resolved through either purchase-and-assumption or the government-assisted
merger method. Bartholomew [8] reported data for 1730 thrifts that were resolved during
the period 1980-1990. Of the 1730 thrifts, 1478 or 85.4% were resolved through this form
of reorganization. According to Table 125 of the FDIC 1990 Annual Report, 1813 banks
were closed during the period from 1945 through 1990. Among these, a total of 1261 or
69.6% of banks were resolved through this form of reorganization. Duan and Yu [29] found
their fairly-priced premium rate to be substantially dierent from that of Merton [72]. Duan
and Yu [29] consider several interesting aspects of deposit insurance, which include varying
the xed coverage premium rate, capital forbearance and the accompanying risk-taking be-
haviour. Their results show that varying the xed premium rate coverage horizon aects the
fairly-priced deposit insurance premium rate; and that the fairly-priced premium rate is not
neutral to capital forbearance. The risk-taking intensity determines how the fairly-priced
premium rate responds to forbearance policy.
In their paper [30], Duan and Yu propose a multi-period deposit insurance pricing model
that simultaneously incorporates the capital standard and the possibility of capital forbear-
ance. Their model employs the GARCH option pricing technique in determining the deposit
insurance value. Their GARCH pricing model oers two distinctive advantages. It explic-
itly considers the implications of the strict enforcement on capital standard as stipulated in
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FDIC Improvement Act of 1991. Additionally, the use of the GARCH model allows them
to capture many robust features exhibited by nancial asset returns. By the GARCH op-
tion pricing theory, the value of a contingent claim is a function of the asset risk premium.
This unique feature is found to be prominent in determining the bank's deposit insurance
value. Duan and Yu [30] further examine the eects of capital forbearance and moral haz-
ard behaviour in the multi-period deposit insurance setting. They report that their fairly
priced premium rate shows an increase with the asset-to-debt ratio. Increasing the coverage
horizon in their model leads to a rise or fall in the value of the premium depending on the
initial leverage (asset-to-debt) position. For a high initial leverage, an increase in the cov-
erage horizon reduces the fairly priced premium rates. The reverse is true for a low initial
leverage. A longer run deposit insurance coverage has the eect of lowering the fairly priced
premium rate. If the capital standard is low relative to the current asset-to-debt ratio, the
fairly priced premium rate tends to increase with the coverage horizon.
3.4 The pricing of interest rate swaps
We now discuss the interest rate swap pricing models of Mallier and Alobaidi [65], Xiaofeng
et al. [96] and Mitra et al. [74].
Mallier and Alobaidi [65] derive expressions for the value of a vanilla xed-for-oating in-
terest rate swap and an in-arrears swap by treating the swaps as a series of FRAs. Their
analysis can be applied both to swaps arranged directly between two counterparties and to
swaps arranged by a dealer. In addition, their analysis also accommodates cases where the
two counterparties have dierent credit ratings. In deriving these expressions, Mallier and
Alobaidi [65] assume that the oating interest rate follows the mean-reverting CIR model
[21, 22]. In contrast to their use of the CIR model, many market practitioners use the
Black-76 formula [13], which is a modication of the Black-Scholes model and was originally
intended for pricing commodities futures. Under Black-76, the underlying forward rates in
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the FRAs which comprise the swap are assumed to be lognormal, and Mallier and Alobaidi
[65] feel that the mean-reverting CIR is a better model to use for interest rate derivatives
than the Black-76 formula. Market practitioners commonly also take the approach whereby
they use a more realistic interest rate model, such as the CIR model used in Mallier and
Alobaidi [65], but to price swaps numerically, usually with a binomial tree or Monte Carlo
simulation technique. The formulae of Mallier and Alobaidi [65] for the swaps under the
CIR model are comparatively simple and could be evaluated numerically both quickly and
accurately, making their formulae extremely competitive with other methods for practition-
ers who want to accurately and quickly price a swap using the CIR model.
Xiaofeng et al. [96], under the foundation of Due and Huang [32], integrates the reduced
form model and the structure model for a default risk measure, giving rise to a new pric-
ing model of interest rate swap with a bilateral default risk. The swap pricing model of
[96] avoids the shortcomings of ignoring the dynamic movements of the rms assets of the
reduced form model. When compared to Li [64], their model adds only a little complexity
and simplies the pricing formula signicantly. By employing a Crank-Nicholson dierence
method, Xiaofeng et al. [96] give numerical solutions of their model in a study of the default
risk eects on the swap rate. Their results are that for a one year interest rate swap with
the coupon paid per quarter, the variance of the default xed rate payer decreases from 0.1
to 0.01, causing only about a 1.35%s increase in the swap rate. Their nding is consistent
with previous results. With the valuation model of [96], the institutes wanting to enter into
a swap contract can consult the swap rate calculated by their model. Contract holders can
nd the prices of the swap at any time, having an intuition on the value of it.
Under the assumption of stochastic interest rates, the paper of Mitra et al. [74] reformulates
the valuation of interest rate swaps, swap leg payments and swap risk measures as a problem
of solving a system of linear equations with random perturbations. The aforementioned
authors develop a sequence of uniform approximations which solves this system and allows
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for fast and accurate computation. The method proposed by Mitra et al. [74] provides a
computationally ecient alternative to Monte Carlo based valuations and risk measurement
of swaps. Mitra et al. [74] demonstrate this by conducting numerical experiments. Their
method provides a potentially important real-time application for analysis and calculation
in markets. For swap valuation and risk management, their paper oers potential avenues
for exploring accelerations of Monte Carlo techniques. This may be achieved by combining
the methods with variance reduction and importance sampling techniques for Monte Carlo
simulations. The linear formulation of equations may oer signicant potential benets for
computational optimization of portfolios, whereby powerful optimization techniques can be
applied from stochastic linear programming methods. Their method may possibly be adapted
to investigate exotic derivatives, which pose many non-trivial analytical and computational
challenges. Mitra et al. [74] believe that their contribution oers computational advantages
of signicance to academic researchers as well as industry, where it is important to calculate
swap and risk measures in short time periods. With the growing trend of computerised and
high frequency trading in industry, this requirement is becoming increasingly important.
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Chapter 4
Mathematical preliminaries
In this chapter, we present mathematical concepts that are used in the commercial banking
problems that follow. Here, our main references are the books Abramowitz and Stegun [4],
Bracewell [16], Etheridge [33], Hartmann [45], Kanwal [57], Nielsen [79], ksendal [80] and
ksendal and Sulem [81].
This chapter is split into two sections. In the rst section we present concepts that are
required to formulate and solve all of the banking problems studied in this thesis. In the
second section we present additional theory needed to formulate and solve the interest rate
swap pricing problem.
4.1 Mathematical concepts relevant to all the banking
problems of the thesis
We now introduce the concepts that are useful for the formulation of all the commercial
banking problems of this thesis. These include concepts such as the Legendre transform,
for the optimal control problem specically, and basic ideas and denitions from stochastic
calculus, which apply to all of the problems.
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The Legendre transform dened below will be used to transform the non-linear second order
PDE arising from the optimal control problem associated with the proxy of our optimal
control problem.
Denition 4.1. (see [55]) Suppose f : Rn ! R is a convex function. For z > 0, dene the
Legendre transform, or the Legendre dual of the function f(x) by the formula:
L(z) = max
x
ff(x)  zxg:
If f(x) is strictly convex, the maximum in the equation above is attained at a unique point,
which we denote by x0. The maximum is in fact attained at the unique solution to the
rst-order condition, namely,
df(x)
dx
  z = 0:
The ideas and concepts presented in Denition 4.2 to Remark 4.24 are the basics that allow
us to formulate our banking model, derive the capital adequacy and liquidity ratios, etc. For
instance, Ito^'s formula without jumps in Remark 4.11 will be used to derive the formula for
the LCR, as this model does not include a jump. The Ito^ formula with the jump in Remark
4.24, on the other hand, will be employed when deriving the capital adequacy ratios (recall,
the CAR, Tier 1 and Leverage ratios) and NSFR liquidity ratio.
Denition 4.2. (see [79, p.317]) Let 
 be any non-empty set. A -algebra or -eld on 

is a class F of subsets of 
 with the following three properties:
1. 
 2 F ;
2. If fA(t)g is a nite or innite sequence of sets in F , then SA(t) 2 F ;
3. If A 2 F then Ac 2 F .
Denition 4.3. (see [79, p.14]) A ltration is a family fF(t)gt2J of -algebras F(t)  F
which is increasing in the sense that whenever s; t 2 J and s  t, then F(s)  F(t) .
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Denition 4.4. (see [33, p.29]) A probability space (
,F ,P), consists of a set 
 (sample
space), a collection of subsets F of 
 (events) and a probability measure P, which species
the probability of each event A 2 F . The collection F is assumed closed under the operations
of countable union and taking complements (-eld). P must of course satisfy the following
axioms:
1. 0  P(A)  1 for all A 2 F ;
2. P[
] = 1;
3. P[A
S
B] = P[A] + P[B] for any disjoint A and B in F ;
4. If A(n) 2 F for all n 2 N and A(1)  A(2)  : : : then P[A(n)] " P[SnA(n)] as n " 1:
Denition 4.5. (see [79, p.2]) Let (
;F ;P) be a probability space, and let J be a time
interval. Specically, assume that J = [0;1) or J = [0; T ] for some T . A k-dimensional
stochastic process is a mapping X : 
J ! Rk such that for each xed t 2 J , the mapping
X(t) : ! 7! X(!; t) = X(t)(w) : 
! Rk
is measurable. A stochastic process is said to be adapted to a ltration fF(t)gt2J if for each
t 2 J , the random variable or vector resulting from the latter mapping is measurable with
respect to F(t). This means that the value X(t) of X at t depends only on information
available at time t.
Denition 4.6. (see [79, p.5]) A k-dimensional standard Brownian motion is a k-dimensional
process fW (t)gt0 such that:
1. W (0) = 0 with probability one;
2. W is continuous;
3. if 0  t(0)      t(n), then the increments W (t(1))   W (t(0)); : : : ;W (t(n))  
W (t(n  1)) are independent;
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4. if 0  s < t, then the increment W (t) W (s) is normally distributed with mean zero
and covariance matrix (t  s)I, where I is the k  k identity matrix.
If W is a one-dimensional standard Brownian motion, and if 0  s < t, then the increment
W (t) W (s) is normally distributed with mean zero and variance t  s. A one-dimensional
process is called a geometric Brownian motion if it has the form eZ , where Z is a one-
dimensional generalized Brownian motion with constant initial value Z(0).
Denition 4.7. (see [79, p.16]) Let fF(t)gt0 be a ltration. A process X is a martingale
if it is integrable and adapted and whenever s; t 2 J and 0  s  t
E[X(t)j F(s)] = X(s):
Denition 4.8. (see [80, p.8]) Let HU denote the -algebra generated by the collection of
all open subsets, U , of a topological space 
. Then HU is called the Borel -algebra on 

and the members B 2 HU are called the Borel sets.
Denition 4.9. (see[80, p.35]) WH(S; T ) denotes the class of processes f(t; !) 2 R satisfy-
ing:
1. (t; !)! f(t; !) is B  F -measurable, where B denotes the Borel -algebra on [0;1);
2. There exists an increasing family of -algebras H(t) with t  0, such that W (t) is a
martingale with respect to H(t) and that f(t) is H(t)-adapted;
3.
P
 Z T
S
f(s; !)2ds <1

= 1:
Denition 4.10. (see [80, p.44]) Let W (t) be a one-dimensional Brownian motion on
(
,F ,P). A (one-dimensional) Ito^ process (or stochastic integral) is a stochastic process
X(t) on (
,F ,P) of the form
X(t) = X(0) +
Z t
0
u(s; !)ds+
Z t
0
v(s; !)dW (s); (4.1)
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where v 2 WH, so that
P
 Z t
0
v(s; !)2ds <1 8 t  0

= 1:
We also assume that u is H(t)-adapted, where H(t) is an increasing family of -algebras,
fH(t)gt0, such that W (t) is a martingale with respect to H(t), and
P
 Z t
0
ju(s; !)jds <1 8 t  0

= 1:
If X(t) is an Ito^ process of the form (4.1), Eq.(4.1) is sometimes written in the shorter
dierential form
dX(t) = udt+ vdW (t): (4.2)
Remark 4.11. (see [80, p.44]) Let X(t) be an Ito^ process given by
dX(t) = udt+ vdW (t):
Let g(t; x) 2 C2([0;1) R). Then Y (t) = g(t;X(t)) is again an Ito^ process, and
dY (t) =
@g
@t
(t;X(t))dt+
@g
@x
(t;X(t))dX(t) +
1
2
@2g
@x2
(t;X(t))(dX(t))2;
where (dX(t))2 = dX(t)dX(t) is computed according to the rules
dtdt = dtdW (t) = dW (t)dt = 0; dW (t)dW (t) = dt:
Remark 4.12. (see [80, p.55]) For Ito^ processes X(t) and Y (t) in R, Ito^'s product rule gives
d(X(t)Y (t)) = X(t)dY (t) + Y (t)dX(t) + dX(t)dY (t):
Denition 4.13. (see [81, p.1]) Let (
,F ,fF(t)gt0,P) be a ltered probability space. An
F(t)-adapted process f(t)gt0  R with (0) = 0 a.s. is called a Levy process if (t) is
continuous in probability and has stationary and independent increments.
Remark 4.14. (see [81, p.1]) Let f(t)g be a Levy process. Then (t) has a cadlag version
(right continuous with left limits) which is also a Levy process.
38
 
 
 
 
In this thesis we will assume that the Levy processes we work with are cadlag. The jump of
(t) at time t  0 is dened by
(t) = (t)  (t ): (4.3)
Let B0 be the family of Borel sets U  R whose closure U does not contain 0. For U 2 B0
we dene
N(t; U) = N(t; U; !) =
X
s:0<st
U((s)): (4.4)
In other words, N(t; U) is the number of jumps of size (s) 2 U which occur before or at
time t. Here N(t; U) is called the Poisson random measure (or jump measure) of ().
Remark 4.15. (see [81, p.2]) Note that N(t; U) is nite for all U 2 B0.
To see why Remark 4.15 is true, dene
T1(!) = infft > 0; (t) 2 Ug:
We claim that T1(!) > 0 a.s. To prove this, note that by right continuity of paths we have
lim
t!0+
(t) = (0) = 0 a:s:
Therefore, for all  > 0 there exists t() > 0 such that j(t)j <  for all t < t(). This implies
that (t) =2 U for all t < t(), if  < dist(0;U).
Next we dene inductively
Tn+1(!) = infft > Tn(!);(t) 2 Ug:
Then by the above argument Tn+1 > Tn a.s. We claim that
Tn !1 as n!1; a:s:
Assume not, then Tn ! T <1. But then
lim
s!T 
(s)
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can not exist, contradicting the existence of left limits of the paths.
It is well known that Brownian motion fW (t)gt0 has stationary and independent increments.
Thus W (t) is a Levy process.
Remark 4.16. (see [81, p.2]) The Poisson process (t) of intensity  > 0 is a Levy process
taking values in N [ 0 and such that
P[(t) = n] =
(t)n
n!
e t; n = 0; 1; 2; :::
Remark 4.17. (see [81, p.2]) The set function
1. U ! N(t; U; !) denes a -nite measure on B0 for each xed t, !. The dierential
form of this measure is written N(t; dz);
2. [a; b) U ! N(b; U; !) N(a; U; !); [a; b)  [0;1); U 2 B0 denes a -nite measure
for each xed !. The dierential form of this measure is written N(dt; dz);
3. (U) = E[N(1; U)], where E = EP denotes expectation with respect to P, also denes
a -nite measure on B0, called the Levy measure of f(t)g;
4. Fix U 2 B0. Then the process
U(t) := U(t; !) := N(t; U; !)
is a Poisson process of intensity  = (U).
To nd the Levy measure  of Y (t) note that if U 2 B0 then
(U) = E[N(1; U)] = E
 X
s;0<s1
U(Y (s))

= E[(number of jumps) U(jump)] = E[(1)U(X)] = X(U);
by independence. We conclude that
 = X : (4.5)
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This shows that a Levy process can be represented by a compound Poisson process if and
only if its Levy measure is nite.
Remark 4.18. (see [81, p.3]) Let f(t)g be a Levy process. Then (t) has the decomposition
(t) = t+ W (t) +
Z
jzj<R
z ~N(t; dz) +
Z
jzjR
zN(t; dz); (4.6)
for some constants ;  2 R and R 2 [0;1]. Here
~N(dt; dz) = N(dt; dz)  (dz)dt (4.7)
is the compensated Poisson random measure of (), and W (t) is a Brownian motion inde-
pendent of ~N(dt; dz). For each A 2 B0 the process
M(t) := ~N(t; A) (4.8)
is a martingale. If  = 0 and R =1, we call (t) a Levy martingale. We can always choose
R = 1.
Remark 4.19. (see [81, p.4]) If Ej(t)j <1 for all t  0, thenZ
jzj1
jzj(dz) <1
and hence we may choose R =1 and write
(t) = 1t+ W (t) +
Z
R
z ~N(t; dz);
where
1 = +
Z
jzj1
z(dz):
Remark 4.20. (see [81, p.4]) A Levy process is a strong Markov process.
Remark 4.21. (see [81, p.5]) A Levy process is a semimartingale.
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Denition 4.22. (see [81, p.5]) Let Ducp denote the space of cadlag adapted processes,
equipped with the topology of uniform convergence on compacts in probability (ucp) : Hn !
H ucp if for all t > 0 sup0st jHn(s) H(s)j ! 0 in probability (An ! A in probability if
for all  > 0 there exists n 2 N such that n  n =) P[jAn   Aj > ] < ).
Let Lucp denote the space of adapted caglad processes (left continuous with right limits),
equipped with the ucp topology. If H(t) is a step function of the form
H(t) = H0f0g(t) +
X
i
Hi(Ti;Ti+1](t);
where Hi 2 F(Ti) and 0 = T0  T1      Tn+1 < 1 are F(t)-stopping times and X is
caglad, we dene
JXH(t) :=
Z t
0
HsdX(s) := H0X(0) +
X
i
Hi(X(Ti+1 ^ t) X(Ti ^ t)); t  0:
Remark 4.23. (see [81, p.5]) Let X be a semi-martingale. Then the mapping JX can be
extended to a continuous linear map
JX : Lucp ! Ducp:
This construction allows us to dene stochastic integrals of the formZ t
0
H(s)d(s)
for all H 2 Lucp. In view of the decomposition (4.6) this integral can be split into integrals
with respect to ds, dW (s), ~N(ds; dz) and N(ds; dz). This makes it natural to consider the
more general stochastic integrals of the form
X(t) = X(0) +
Z t
0
(s; !)ds+
Z t
0
(s; !)dW (s) +
Z t
0
Z
R
(s; z; !) N(ds; dz); (4.9)
where the integrands are F(t)-predictable and satisfy the growth conditionZ t
0

j(s)j+ 2(s) +
Z
R
2(s; z)(dz)

ds <1
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a.s. for all t > 0.
For simplicity we have put
N(ds; dz) =
8><>:N(ds; dz)  (dz)ds if jzj < RN(ds; dz) if jzj  R;
with R as in Remark 4.18.
The following shorthand dierential notation for the process X(t) satisfying Eq.(4.9) will be
used:
dX(t) = (t)dt+ (t)dW (t) +
Z
R
(t; z) N(dt; dz): (4.10)
Processes such as in Eq.(4.10) are called Ito^-Levy processes.
Recall that a semi-martingaleM(t) is called a local martingale up to time T (with respect to
P) if there exists an increasing sequence of F(t)-stopping times n such that limn!1 n = T
a.s. and M(t ^ n) is a martingale with respect to P for all n.
Note that if
1.
E
 Z T
0
Z
R
2(t; z)(dz)dt

<1; (4.11)
then the process
M(t) :=
Z t
0
Z
R
(s; z) ~N(ds; dz); 0  t  T
is a martingale;
2. Z T
0
Z
R
2(t; z)(dz)dt <1 a:s:; (4.12)
then M(t) is a local martingale, 0  t  T .
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Remark 4.24. (see [81, p.7]) Suppose X(t) 2 R is an Ito^-Levy process of the form
dX(t) = (t; !)dt+ (t; !)dW (t) +
Z
R
(t; z; !) N(dt; dz); (4.13)
where
N(dt; dz) =
8><>:N(dt; dz)  (dz)ds if jzj < RN(dt; dz) if jzj  R; (4.14)
for some R 2 [0;1].
Let f 2 C2(R2) and dene Y (t) = f(t;X(t)). Then Y (t) is again an Ito^-Levy process and
Ito^'s formula applied to Y (t) gives
dY (t) =
@f
@t
(t;X(t))dt+
@f
@x
(t;X(t))[(t; !)dt+ (t; !)dW (t)]
+
1
2
2(t; !)
@2f
@x2
(t;X(t))dt
+
Z
jzj<R

f(t;X(t ) + (t; z; !))  f(t;X(t ))
  @f
@x
(t;X(t ))(t; z; !)

(dz)dt
+
Z
R

f(t;X(t ) + (t; z; !))  f(t;X(t ))

N(dt; dz): (4.15)
4.2 Additional theory for pricing interest rate swaps
In this section we introduce additional concepts necessary for deriving the swap pricing
models. These include concepts such as Kummer's functions, Laguerre polynomials, Bessel
functions and Green's function. Applying these, it is possible to interpret the value of a
swap as the sum of a series of FRAs.
Denition 4.25. (see [89, p.2] or [98, p.124]) The conuent hypergeometric dierential
equation is the second-order ordinary dierential equation (ODE)
x
d2y
dx2
+ (c  x)dy
dx
  ay = 0:
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It is also known as Kummer's dierential equation. It has a regular singular point at zero
and irregular singularity at 1. The solutions
y = b1F1(a; c; x) + b2U(a; c; x)
are called conuent hypergeometric functions of the rst and second kinds respectively.
Denition 4.26. The conuent hypergeometric function of the rst kind F1(a; b; z), also
known as Kummer's function of the rst kind, is a degenerate form of the hypergeometric
function F2(a; b; c; z) which arises as a solution to the conuent hypergeometric dierential
equation. Some notations used for this function include F (; ; x) (see [63]), M(a; b; z) (see
[5]) and (a; b; z) (see [48]).
Kummer's function of the rst kind has a hypergeometric series given by
F1(a; b; z) = 1 +
a
b
z +
a(a+ 1)
b(b+ 1)
z2
2!
+    =
1X
k=0
(a)k
(b)k
zk
k!
;
where (a)k and (b)k are Pochhammer symbols. If a and b are integers, a < 0, and either
b < 0 or b < a, then the series yields a polynomial with a nite number of terms. If b is an
integer such that b  0, then F1(a; b; z) is undened. Kummer's function of the rst kind is
given in terms of the Laguerre polynomial by
Lmn (x) =
(m+ n)!
m!n!
F1( n;m+ 1; x);
(see [7]). It has the following integral representation (see [4]):
F1(a; b; z) =
 (b)
 (b  a) (a)
Z 1
0
eztta 1(1  t)b a 1dt:
Denition 4.27. (see [50, p.1481] or [98, p.124]) The Laguerre dierential equation is given
by
x
d2y
dx2
+ (1  x)dy
dx
+ y = 0:
This equation is a special case of the more general associated Laguerre dierential equation,
dened by
x
d2y
dx2
+ (v + 1  x)dy
dx
+ y = 0;
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where  and v are real numbers with v = 0. The general solution to the associated equation
is
t = C1U( ; 1 + v; x) + C2Lv(x);
where U(a; b; x) is a conuent hypergeometric function of the rst kind and Lv(x) is a
generalized Laguerre polynomial.
Denition 4.28. (see [7, p.726]) Solutions to the associated Laguerre dierential equation
with v 6= 0 and k an integer are called associated Laguerre polynomial Lkv(x).
Denition 4.29. (see [4]) A Bessel function In(x) is dened by the recurrence relations
In+1 + In 1 =
2n
x
In
and
In+1   In 1 =  2dIn
dx
:
The Bessel functions are frequently dened as the solutions to the dierential equation (see
[4, p.358])
x2
d2y
dx2
+ x
dy
dx
+ (x2   n2)y = 0:
Denition 4.30. (see [4, p.1020]) The Heaviside step function is a mathematical function
denoted H(x), or sometimes (x) or u(x), and also known as the \unit step function". The
term \Heaviside step function" and its symbol can represent either a piecewise constant
function or a generalized function.
When dened as a piecewise constant function, the Heaviside step function is given by
H(x) =
8>>>>><>>>>>:
0 if x < 0
1
2
if x = 0
1 if x > 0
(see [4, p.1020]) or [16, p.61]). When dened as a generalized function, it can be dened as
a function (x) such that Z
(x)0(x)dx =  (0)
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for 0(x) the derivative of a suciently smooth function (x) that decays suciently quickly
(see [57]).
Denition 4.31. (see [4, p.1020]) The Laplace transform, denoted L, is an integral trans-
form dened as
f(s) = LfF (t)g =
Z 1
0
e stF (t)dt;
where F (t) is a function of the real variable t and s is a complex variable.
Denition 4.32. The delta function  is a linear functional from a space of test functions
f . The action of  on f , commonly denoted [f ] or h; fi, gives the value at zero of f for
any function f .
The delta function can be viewed as the derivative of the Heaviside step function (see [15,
p.94])
d
dx
[H(x)] = (x):
The delta function has the fundamental property thatZ 1
 1
f(x)(x  a)dx = f(a)
and, in fact, Z a+
a 
f(x)(x  a)dx = f(a)
for  > 0.
Additional identities include (x  a) = 0 for x 6= a, and
(ax) =
1
jaj(x);
(x2   a2) = 1
2jaj

(x+ a) + (x  a)

:
More generally, the delta function of a function of x is given by
[g(x)] =
X
i
(x  xi)
jg0(xi)j ;
where the xi's are the roots of g.
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Denition 4.33. (see [45]) Given a linear dierential operator L = L(x) acting on the
collection of distributions over a subset 
 of some Euclidean space Rn, a Green's Function
G = G(x; s) at the point s 2 
 corresponding to L is any solution of
LG(x; s) = (x  s);
where  denotes the delta function.
The motivation for dening Green's function is widespread, but by multiplying the above
identity by a function f(s) and integrating with respect to s yields (see [15, p.94])Z
LG(x; s)f(s)ds =
Z
(x  s)f(s)ds:
The right hand side reduces to f(x) due to the properties of the delta function, and hence
because L is a linear operator acting only on x, and not s, the left hand side can be rewritten
as
L
Z
G(x; s)f(s)ds

:
This reduction is particularly useful when solving for u = u(x) in dierential equations of
the form
Lu(x) = f(x);
where the above arithmetic conrms that
Lu(x) = L
Z
G(x; s)f(s)ds

and whereby it follows that u has the specic integral form
u(x) =
Z
G(x; s)f(s)ds:
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Chapter 5
The jump-diusion banking model
and optimal control problem
We now present the jump-diusion banking model which will be used to formulate problems
two through four described earlier. In particular, we introduce models for the bank's Total
capital, its assets and the interest rate model associated with the nancial market. We also
construct an SDE for the value of the bank's TNRWAs here. Further, we present the optimal
control problem and show, using the methodology of Gao [38], how the proxy (which is the
optimal solution of [38, 78]) to the solution of the control problem with the jump can be
derived via the Legendre transform and dual theory. We will on occasion directly quote from
the methodology of Gao [38].
The main references of this chapter are Vasicek [91], Cox et al. [22], Deelstra et al. [26],
Kramkov and Schachermayer [62], Jonsson and Sircar [55], Choulli and Hurd [20], Xiao et
al. [95], and Cox and Huang [24].
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5.1 Introducing the nancial market and formulating
the asset portfolio
We assume throughout this chapter that we are working with a ltered probability space
(
;F ;F(t)t0;P), which satises the usual hypotheses of completeness and right continuity.
The ltration (F(t))t0 is assumed to be generated by the Brownian motions appearing in
the dynamics of the bank items which we will introduce throughout.
We now introduce the nancial market in which the bank operates. We assume that the
bank invests its Total capital in a market which allows for at least two investment oppor-
tunities, viz., a riskless treasury security and risky marketable security. It is assumed that
the aforementioned assets can be bought and sold without incurring any transaction cost or
restriction on short sales. The market is also assumed to allow the bank the opportunity to
invest in a loan. In the dynamics of the bank items introduced below, Wr and WS denote
two independent one-dimensional standard Brownian motions.
In our optimization problem we assume the bank to continuously raise Total capital at the
rate
dC(t) = c(t)dt;
C(0) > 0: (5.1)
The rst asset in the nancial market is a riskless treasury. We denote its price at time t by
S0(t) and assume that its dynamics evolve according to the ODE
dS0(t)
S0(t)
= r(t)dt;
S0(0) = 1: (5.2)
The dynamics of the short-rate process, r(t), are given by the SDE
dr(t) = (a  br(t))dt  rdWr(t); (5.3)
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for t  0 and where r =
p
k1r(t) + k2. The coecients a, b, k1 and k2, as well as the initial
value r(0) are all positive real constants. The above dynamics recover, as a special case, the
Vasicek [91] (resp. Cox et al. [22]) dynamics when k1 (resp. k2) is equal to zero. The term
structure of the interest rates is ane under the aforementioned dynamics.
The second asset in the market is a risky marketable security whose price is denoted by S(t),
t  0. Its dynamics are given by the equation
dS(t)
S(t)
= r(t)dt+ 1(dWs(t) + 1dt) + 2r(dWr(t) + 2rdt);
S(0) = 1; (5.4)
with 1 and 2 (resp 1, 2) being constants (resp. positive constants) as in Deelstra et al.
[26].
The third asset is a loan to be amortized over a period [0; T ], whose value at time t  0 is
denoted by L(t). We assume that its dynamics can be described by the following SDE with
Levy noise
dL(t)
L(t ) = r(t)dt+ L(T   t; r(t))(dWr(t) + 2rdt) + dK(t): (5.5)
Here K(t) is given by
K(t) =
Z t
0
Z
R
(t; z; !) N(dt; dz):
In the above dynamics,
N(dt; dz) =
8><>:N(dt; dz)  (dz)dt if jzj < RN(dt; dz) if jzj  R; (5.6)
for some R 2 [0;1), denotes a compensated Poisson random measure independent of Wr
and WS. In Eq.(5.6), N denotes an F(t)-adapted Poisson random measure, while  denotes
an intensity measure assumed to be a Levy measure.
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We now model the TNRWAs of the bank. Let X(t) denote the value of the TNRWAs at
time t 2 [0; T ]. The dynamics of the TNRWAs are described by the formula
dX(t) = r(t)
dS0(t)
S0(t)
+ S(t)
dS(t)
S(t)
+ L(t)
dL(t)
L(t ) + dC(t)
= [X(t)r(t) + S(t)(11 + 22
2
r) + L(t)2L(T   t; r(t))r + c]dt
+ S(t)1dWS(t) + (L(t)L(T   t; r(t)) + S(t)2r)dWr(t)
+ L(t)dK(t); (5.7)
where S(t), L(t) and r(t) denote the amounts of Total capital invested in the two risky
assets (marketable security and loan) and in the riskless asset (treasury) respectively.
5.2 Formulating the control problem and deriving the
proxy
In this section we formulate the optimization problem and derive the proxy to its solution.
We wish to choose a capital allocation strategy in order to maximize the expected utility of
the bank's TNRWAs at a future date T > 0. Mathematically, the stochastic optimal control
problem can be stated as follows:
Problem 5.1. Our objective is to maximize the expected utility of the bank's TNRWAs at
a future date T > 0. Thus we must
maximize J(S; L) = E[u(X(T ))]
subject to
8>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>:
dr(t) = (a  br(t))dt  rdWr(t);
dX(t) = [X(t)r(t) + S(t)(11 + 22
2
r) + L(t)2L(T   t; r(t))r + c(t)]dt
+S(t)1dWS(t) + (L(t)L(T   t; r(t)) + S(t)2r)dWr(t) + L(t)dK(t);
X(0) = x0; r(0) = r0;
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with 0  t  T , and where X(0) = x0 and r(0) = r0 denote the initial conditions of the
optimal control problem.
If we discard the eect of the jump associated with the loan and, in addition, describe the
bank's objective with the logarithmic utility function u(x) = lnx for x > 0, then Problem
5.1 becomes identical to the one solved in the papers Gao [38] and Muller and Witbooi [78].
Since we assume small jumps in the value of the loan, we propose using the optimal solution
of the control problem of [38, 78] as a proxy to the optimal capital allocation strategy that
solves Problem 5.1. Based on the methodology of Gao [38], we will now show how the Leg-
endre transform and dual theory can be used to derive the proxy.
We note that the utility function u() is strictly concave up and satises the Inada conditions
u0(+1) = 0 and u0(0) = +1. By using the classical tools of stochastic optimal control, we
dene the value function:
H(t; r; x) = sup
S ;L
E(u(X(T )j r(t) = r;X(t) = x)); 0 < t < T: (5.8)
The value function can be considered as a kind of utility function. The marginal utility of
the value function is a constant, while the marginal utility of the original utility function
u() decreases to zero as x!1 (see Kramkov and Schachermayer [62]). The value function
also inherits the convexity of the utility function (see Jonsson and Sircar [55]). Moreover, it
is strictly convex for t < T even if u() is not.
The maximum principle leads to the HJB equation below (see also [38]):
Ht + sup
S ;L

a(b  r)Hr + [xr + (11 + 222r)S + 2LrL + c]Hx
+
1
2
[21
2
S + (LL + 2rS)
2]Hxx +
2r
2
Hrr
  (LrL + 22rS)Hrx

= 0; (5.9)
where the time variable t has been suppressed. Above Ht, Hr, Hx, Hrr, Hxx and Hrx denote
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partial derivatives of rst and second orders with respect to time, interest rate and TNRWAs.
The rst-order maximizing conditions for the optimal strategies S and L of the proxy are:
S =  1
1
Hx
Hxx
(5.10)
and
L =
r(12   21)Hx + 1rHrx
1LHxx
: (5.11)
If we put Eqs. (5.10) and (5.11) into Eq.(5.9), we obtain a PDE for the value function H:
Ht + a(b  r)Hr + 
2
r
2
Hrr + (xr + c)Hx
  
2
1
2
H2x
Hxx
  (2rHx   rHrx)
2
2Hxx
= 0: (5.12)
We must now solve Eq.(5.12) for the value function H and replace it in Eq.(5.10) and
Eq.(5.11). The non-linear second order PDE above is very dicult to solve.
At this point we shall specify a particular candidate for the function L appearing in Eq.(5.5).
We assume L to take the form
L(T   t; r(t)) = h(T   t)r;
with
h(t) =
2(emt   1)
m  (b  k12) + emt(m+ b  k12)
and
m =
p
(b  k12)2 + 2k1:
We now transform the non-linear second order PDE into a linear PDE via the Legendre
transform and dual theory. We try to nd an explicit solution to the transformed PDE
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under the logarithm utility function:
Suppose f : Rn ! R is a convex function. For z > 0, we dene the Legendre dual of the
function f(x) as
L(z) = max
x
ff(x)  zxg: (5.13)
We assume that f(x) is strictly convex. Then the maximum in the equation above is attained
at a unique point, which we denote by x0. In fact, the maximum is attained at the unique
solution to the rst-order condition
df(x)
dx
  z = 0: (5.14)
We may thus write
L(z) = f(x0)  z(x0): (5.15)
According to Denition 4.1, we may take advantage of the assumed convexity of the value
function H(t; r; x) to dene the Legendre transform:
H^(t; r; x) := sup
x>0
fH(t; r; x)  zxj 0 < x <1g; 0 < t < T; (5.16)
where z > 0 denotes the dual variable to x. The value of x where this optimum occurs is
denoted by g(t; r; z), so that
g(t; r; z) := inf
x>0
fxj H(t; r; x)  zx+ H^(t; r; z)g; 0 < t < T: (5.17)
This leads to
H^(t; r; z) = H(t; r; g)  zg;
g(t; r; z) = x: (5.18)
According to Eqs. (5.15) and (5.16), we have
Hx = z: (5.19)
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Based on Eqs. (5.18) and (5.19), the function H^ related to g is given by
g =  H^z: (5.20)
We can therefore take either one of the two functions g and H^ as the dual of H. We choose to
work with the function g, as it is easier to compute numerically and suces for the purpose
of computing the proxy.
If we dierentiate Eqs. (5.18) and (5.19) with respect to t, r and z, the transformation rules
for the derivatives of the value function H and the dual function H^ are according to Choulli
and Hurd [20], Jonsson and Sircar [55] and Xiao et al. [95]:
Hx = z; Ht = H^t; Hr = H^r;
Hrr = H^rr   H^
2
rz
H^zz
; Hxr =  H^rz
H^zz
; Hxx =   1
H^zz
: (5.21)
At time T , we dene
u^(z) := sup
x>0
fu(x)  zxg;
and
G(z) := inf
x>0
fxj u(x)  zx  u^(z)g:
Kramkov and Schachermayer [62] and Cox and Huang [24] showed that the function u^(z)
and u(x) can themselves be obtained from each other by using Legendre transforms:
u^(z) = sup
x>0
fu(x)  zxg;
u(x) = inf
z>0
fxj u^(z) + zxg: (5.22)
The primary problem can thus be turned into a dual problem. By substituting expression
(5.21), we rewrite Eq.(5.12) as
H^t + a(b  r)H^r + 
2
r
2
 
H^rr   H^
2
rz
H^zz

+ (rx+ c)z
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+
21
2
z2H^zz   (2zrH^zz + H^rz)
2
2H^zz
= 0; (5.23)
namely, as the following PDE:
H^t + a(b  r)H^r + 
2
r
2
H^rr + (rx+ c)z
+
1
2
(21   222r)z2H^zz   22rzH^rz = 0: (5.24)
If we combine the above equation with Eq.(5.20) and dierentiate the result for H^ with
respect to z, we get
gt + a(b  r)gr   rg   c  222rgr   rzgz +
2r
2
grr
  (22r   21)zgz  
1
2
(22
2
r   21)z2gzz   222rzgrz = 0: (5.25)
We notice that the non-linear second order PDE Eq.(5.12) has been transformed into a lin-
ear PDE Eq.(5.25) by using a Legendre transform and dual theory. For Eq.(5.25) a solution
can easily be found under a given utility function via the classical variable decomposition
approach.
From Eqs. (5.10), (5.11) and (5.18)-(5.21), the proxy is computed as the feedback formulas
in terms of the derivatives of the value function. In terms of the dual function g, it is given
by
L =
r(12   21)Hx + 1rHrx
1LHxx
=
r[(12   21)z   1 H^rzH^zz ]
1L(  1H^zz )
=
r[(12   21)zgz   1gr]
1L
; (5.26)
and
S =  1
1
Hx
Hxx
=
1
1
zH^zz =  1
1
zgz: (5.27)
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We now solve the linear PDE Eq.(5.25) for g and replace these solutions in Eqs. (5.26) and
(5.27). From Eq.(5.14), we derive the dual of the logarithm utility function : G(z) = 1
z
and
H^(z) =   ln z   1. We try to nd a solution of Eq.(5.25) in the following way:
g(t; r; z) =
1
z
A(rt) +B(t); (5.28)
where the boundary conditions are given by A(rT ) = 1 and B(T ) = 0. Substituting Eq.(5.28)
into Eq.(5.25), we obtain:
B0(t)  rB(t)  c(t) + 1
z
[a(b  r)A0(r)  222rA0(r) +
2r
2
A00(r)] = 0:
This equation can be decomposed into two conditions in order to eliminate the dependence
in z:
B0(t)  rB(t)  c(t) = 0;
B(T ) = 0; (5.29)
a(b  r)A0(r)  222rA0(r) +
2r
2
A00(r) = 0;
A(rT ) = 1: (5.30)
The solutions to Eqs. (5.29) and (5.30) which take the boundary conditions into account are
A(rT ) = 1: (5.31)
B(t) =  c(t)
n1  e r(T t)
r
o
; (5.32)
or B(t) =  c(t)aT tj, where aT tj is an annuity of duration T   t. This leads to
g =
1
z
  c(t)aT tj: (5.33)
Introducing Eq.(5.33) into Eqs. (5.26) and (5.27), we obtain the approximate optimal allo-
cation strategy of Total capital in the loan under a logarithm utility as
L =
r[(12   21)zgz   1gr]
1L
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=
r[(12   21)( 1z )  1aT tj cr + 1e r(T t) (T t)cr ]
1L
=
r[((21   12)(caT tj + x))  1aT tj cr + 1e r(T t) (T t)cr ]
1L
=
r(21   12)x
1L
  rc
"
(12   21)aT tjrt
1L
+
aT tjrt   (T   t)(1  raT tjrt)
rL
#
;
or if we denote the approximate optimal proportion of Total capital invested in the loan by
L, then we can write
L =
r(21   12)
1L
  rc
x
"
(12   21)aT tjrt
1L
+
aT tjrt   (T   t)(1  raT tjrt)
rL
#
: (5.34)
Furthermore, the approximate optimal amount of Total capital invested in the marketable
security is given by
S =  1
1
zgz =
1
1
1
z
=
1
1
(x+ caT tjrt);
or
S =
1
1
+
caT tjrt
x
; (5.35)
where S denotes the approximate optimal proportion of Total capital invested in the mar-
ketable security. According to the above models, we may write the approximate optimal
amount of Total capital invested in the treasury as
r = x  L   S;
or
r = 1  L   S; (5.36)
where r is the approximate optimal proportion of Total capital invested in the treasury.
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Below we present a simulation of the optimal solution to the control problems of [38, 78].
We assume that the interest rate follows the CIR [22] dynamics (k2 = 0). We consider an
investment horizon of T = 10 years and assume that Total capital is raised at the xed rate
of c = 0:415. The rest of the parameters of the simulation are
a = 0:0112, b = 0:0332, k1 = 0:00112, 1 = 0:11, 1 = 0:05, 2 = 0:22 and 2 = 0:1
with initial conditions
r(0) = 0:09 and X(0) = 2:95.
0 2 4 6 8 10
−0.5
0
0.5
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1.5
Time in years
 
 
Marketable security
Treasury
Loan
Figure 5.1: A simulation of the optimal proportions S, r and L of Total capital invested
respectively in the marketable security, treasury and loan of the diusion banking model.
For the simulation parameters considered, the optimal capital allocation strategy depicted
in Figure 5.1 is to diversify the TNRWAs away from the risky assets (marketable security
and loan) and towards the riskless treasury security.
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Chapter 6
The capital adequacy ratios of the
jump-diusion banking model
In this chapter we derive the formulae of the capital adequacy ratios in terms of the proxy to
the solution of Problem 5.1. We present a numerical example illustrating the performance
of the ratios under the proxy. In the example we compare the levels of the capital adequacy
ratios of our jump-diusion banking model to that corresponding to the diusion banking
model of Muller and Witbooi [78].
In this chapter we will mainly reference Oksendal and Sulem [81], Mukuddem-Petersen and
Petersen [84], Muller and Witbooi [78] and the Basel document [10].
6.1 Modelling the capital adequacy ratios
In Propositions 6.1-6.3 we derive the formulae of the bank's capital adequacy ratios in terms
of the proxy. First we derive the dynamics of the TRWAs of the bank. We will also introduce
the Tier 1 capital model which is needed to derive the Tier 1 and Leverage ratios. In the
proofs of the propositions, we apply the general Ito^ formulae (with jumps), for which we
refer to the book [81] of Oksendal and Sulem.
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We assume that the TRWAs of the bank can at time t be described by the SDE
dY (t) = 0 r(t)dS0(t)
S0(t)
+ 0:2 S(t)dS(t)
S(t)
+ 0:5 L(t) dL(t)
L(t ) + dC(t)
= [0:2S(t)(r(t) + 11 + 2
2
r2) + 0:5L(t)(r(t) + L(T   t; r(t))2r)
+ c(t)]dt+ 0:2S(t)1dWS(t)
+ (0:2S(t)2r + 0:5L(t)L(T   t; r(t)))dWr(t) + 0:5L(t)dK(t); (6.1)
where 0, 0:2 and 0:5 are the risk-weights associated with respectively the treasury, marketable
security and loan under the Basel III dispensation (see [10, 84, 78]).
Proposition 6.1. With the dynamics of the Total capital, C(t), given by the ODE in
Eq.(5.1), and with the dynamics of the TRWAs, Y (t), given by Eq.(6.1), we can write the
dynamics of the CAR at time t as:
d(t) =
c(t)
Y (t)
dt+ C(t)
(
  1
Y 2(t)

0:2S(t)(r(t) + 11 + 2
2
r2)
+ 0:5L(t)(r(t) + L(T   t; r(t))2r) + c(t)

+
1
Y 3(t)

(0:2S(t)1)
2 + (0:2S(t)2r + 0:5L(t)L(T   t; r(t)))2

dt
  1
Y 2(t)

0:2S(t)1dWS(t) + (0:2S(t)2r + 0:5L(t)L(T   t; r(t)))dWr(t)

+
Z
jzj<R

1
Y (t ) + (t; z; !)  
1
Y (t ) +
(t; z; !)
Y 2(t )

(dz)dt
+
Z
R

1
Y (t ) + (t; z; !)  
1
Y (t )

N(dt; dz)
)
: (6.2)
Proof of Proposition 6.1: Let dY c(t) denote the continuous part of dY (t). Then
dY c(t) = [0:2S(t)(r(t) + 11 + 2
2
r2) + 0:5L(t)(r(t) + L(T   t; r(t))2r)
+ c(t)]dt+ 0:2S(t)1dWS(t) + (0:2S(t)2r + 0:5L(t)L(T   t; r(t)))dWr(t):
By applying Ito^'s Formula to (Y (t)) = g(t; Y (t)) = 1
Y (t)
, we get
d(Y (t)) =
@g
@t
(t; Y (t))dt+
@g
@y
(t; Y (t))dY c(t) +
1
2
@2g
@y2
(t; Y (t))

(0:2S(t)1)
2dt
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+ (0:2S(t)2r + 0:5L(t)L(T   t; r(t)))2dt

+
Z
jzj<R

g(t; Y (t ) + (t; z; !))  g(t; Y (t ))  @g
@y
(t; Y (t ))(t; z; !)

(dz)dt
+
Z
R

g(t; Y (t ) + (t; z; !))  g(t; Y (t ))

N(dt; dz)
=

  1
Y 2(t)

0:2S(t)(r(t) + 11 + 2
2
r2) + 0:5L(t)(r(t) + L(T   t; r(t))2r)
+ c(t)

+
1
Y 3(t)

(0:2S(t)1)
2 + (0:2S(t)2r + 0:5L(t)L(T   t; r(t)))2

dt
  1
Y 2(t)

0:2S(t)1dWS(t) + (0:2S(t)2r + 0:5L(t)L(T   t; r(t)))dWr(t)

+
Z
jzj<R

1
Y (t ) + (t; z; !)  
1
Y (t ) +
(t; z; !)
Y 2(t )

(dz)dt
+
Z
R

1
Y (t ) + (t; z; !)  
1
Y (t )

N(dt; dz):
Let (t) denote the CAR at time t for t 2 [0; T ]. Then by denition, we can write (t) as
(t) =
C(t)
Y (t)
= C(t)(Y (t)):
We apply Ito^'s Product Rule to (t) = C(t)(Y (t)) to nd an expression for d(t):
d(t) = dC(t)(Y (t)) + C(t)d(Y (t)) + dC(t)d(Y (t))
=
c(t)
Y (t)
dt+ C(t)
(
  1
Y 2(t)

0:2S(t)(r(t) + 11 + 2
2
r2)
+ 0:5L(t)(r(t) + L(T   t; r(t))2r) + c(t)

+
1
Y 3(t)

(0:2S(t)1)
2 + (0:2S(t)2r + 0:5L(t)L(T   t; r(t)))2

dt
  1
Y 2(t)

0:2S(t)1dWS(t) + (0:2S(t)2r + 0:5L(t)L(T   t; r(t)))dWr(t)

+
Z
jzj<R

1
Y (t ) + (t; z; !)  
1
Y (t ) +
(t; z; !)
Y 2(t )

(dz)dt
+
Z
R

1
Y (t ) + (t; z; !)  
1
Y (t )

N(dt; dz)
)
:
This concludes the proof.
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The next step is to derive the dynamics of the Leverage and Tier 1 ratios based on the proxy.
At this point, we introduce a model for the Tier 1 capital of the bank. Suppose that the
Tier 2 capital of the bank is described by the ODE dCT2(t) = c2(t)dt with CT2(0) > 0 and
c2(t) < c(t) for t 2 [0; T ]. Then the dynamics of the Tier 1 capital can be written as
dCT1(t) = (c(t)  c2(t))dt;
CT1(0) > 0: (6.3)
Proposition 6.2. With the dynamics of the Tier 1 capital, CT1(t), given by the ODE in
Eq.(6.3) and with the TRWAS, Y (t), given by Eq.(6.1), the dynamics of the Tier 1 Ratio at
time t can be expressed in the following way:
dT1(t) =
c(t)  c2(t)
Y (t)
dt+ CT1(t)
(
  1
Y 2(t)

0:2S(t)(r(t) + 11 + 2
2
r2)
+ 0:5L(t)(r(t) + L(T   t; r(t))2r) + c(t)

+
1
Y 3(t)

(0:2S(t)1)
2 + (0:2S(t)2r + 0:5L(t)L(T   t; r(t)))2

dt
  1
Y 2(t)

0:2S(t)1dWS(t) + (0:2S(t)2r + 0:5L(t)L(T   t; r(t)))dWr(t)

+
Z
jzj<R

1
Y (t ) + (t; z; !)  
1
Y (t ) +
(t; z; !)
Y 2(t )

(dz)dt
+
Z
R

1
Y (t ) + (t; z; !)  
1
Y (t )

N(dt; dz)
)
: (6.4)
Proof of Proposition 6.2: If we let T1(t) denote the Tier 1 Ratio at time t for t 2 [0; T ],
then by denition we can write T1(t) as
T1(t) =
CT1(t)
Y (t)
= CT1(t)(Y (t)):
By applying Ito^'s Product Rule to T1(t) = CT1(t)(Y (t)), we calculate dT1(t) as follows:
dT1(t) = dCT1(t)(Y (t)) + CT1(t)d(Y (t)) + dCT1(t)d(Y (t))
=
c(t)  c2(t)
Y (t)
dt+ CT1(t)
(
  1
Y 2(t)

0:2S(t)(r(t) + 11 + 2
2
r2)
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+ 0:5L(t)(r(t) + L(T   t; r(t))2r) + c(t)

+
1
Y 3(t)

(0:2S(t)1)
2 + (0:2S(t)2r + 0:5L(t)L(T   t; r(t)))2

dt
  1
Y 2(t)

0:2S(t)1dWS(t) + (0:2S(t)2r + 0:5L(t)L(T   t; r(t)))dWr(t)

+
Z
jzj<R

1
Y (t ) + (t; z; !)  
1
Y (t ) +
(t; z; !)
Y 2(t )

(dz)dt
+
Z
R

1
Y (t ) + (t; z; !)  
1
Y (t )

N(dt; dz)
)
:
This concludes the proof.
Proposition 6.3. For the simplied version of the TNRWAs appearing in Problem 5.1 and
with the dynamics of the Tier 1 capital, CT1(t), given by Eq.(6.3), the dynamics of the bank's
Leverage Ratio follows the SDE
dl(t) =
c(t)  c2(t)
X(t)
dt+ CT1(t)
(
  1
X2(t)

X(t)r(t) + S(t)(11 + 22
2
r)
+ L(t)2L(T   t; r(t))r + c(t)

+
1
X3(t)

(S(t)1)
2 + (L(t)L(T   t; r(t))
+ S(t)2r)
2

dt  1
X2(t)

S(t)1dWS(t) + (L(t)L(T   t; r(t)) + S(t)2r)dWr(t)

+
Z
jzj<R

1
X(t ) + (t; z; !)  
1
X(t ) +
(t; z; !)
X2(t )

(dz)dt
+
Z
R

1
X(t ) + (t; z; !)  
1
X(t )

N(dt; dz)
)
: (6.5)
Proof of Proposition 6.3: Let dXc(t) denote the continuous part of dX(t), i.e.,
dXc(t) = fX(t)r(t) + S(t)[11 + 222r ] + L(t)2L(T   t; r(t))r + cgdt
+ S(t)1dWS(t) + (L(t)L(T   t; r(t)) + S(t)2r)dWr(t):
Ito^'s Lemma applied to (X(t)) = g(t;X(t)) = 1
X(t)
yields
d(X(t)) =
@g
@t
(t;X(t))dt+
@g
@x
(t;X(t))dXc(t) +
1
2
@2g
@x2
(t;X(t))

(S(t)1)
2dt
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+ (S(t)2r + L(t)L(T   t; r(t)))2dt

+
Z
jzj<R

g(t;X(t ) + (t; z; !))  g(t;X(t ))  @g
@x
(t;X(t ))(t; z; !)

(dz)dt
+
Z
R

g(t;X(t ) + (t; z; !))  g(t;X(t ))

N(dt; dz)
=

  1
X2(t)

X(t)r(t) + S(t)(11 + 22
2
r) + L(t)2L(T   t; r(t))r + c(t)

+
1
X3(t)

(S(t)1)
2 + (L(t)L(T   t; r(t)) + S(t)2r)2

dt
  1
X2(t)

S(t)1dWS(t) + (L(t)L(T   t; r(t)) + S(t)2r)dWr(t)

+
Z
jzj<R

1
X(t ) + (t; z; !)  
1
X(t ) +
(t; z; !)
X2(t )

(dz)dt
+
Z
R

1
X(t ) + (t; z; !)  
1
X(t )

N(dt; dz):
Let l(t) denote the Leverage Ratio at time t for t 2 [0; T ]. By denition,
l(t) =
CT1(t)
X(t)
= CT1(t)(X(t)):
We apply Ito^'s Product Rule to l(t) = CT1(t)(X(t)) to nd an expression for dl(t) as
follows:
dl(t) = dCT1(t)(X(t)) + CT1(t)d(X(t)) + dCT1(t)d(X(t))
=
c(t)  c2(t)
X(t)
dt+ CT1(t)
(
  1
X2(t)

X(t)r(t) + S(t)(11 + 22
2
r)
+ L(t)2L(T   t; r(t))r + c(t)

+
1
X3(t)

(S(t)1)
2 + (L(t)L(T   t; r(t))
+ S(t)2r)
2

dt  1
X2(t)

S(t)1dWS(t) + (L(t)L(T   t; r(t)) + S(t)2r)dWr(t)

+
Z
jzj<R

1
X(t ) + (t; z; !)  
1
X(t ) +
(t; z; !)
X2(t )

(dz)dt
+
Z
R

1
X(t ) + (t; z; !)  
1
X(t )

N(dt; dz)
)
:
This concludes the proof.
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6.2 Simulating the capital adequacy ratios numerically
We now present a numerical simulation in order to characterize the behaviour of the capital
adequacy ratios. The simulation is based on the assumption that the interest rate follows
the CIR [22] dynamics (k2 = 0) and that the nancial market consists of a treasury, a mar-
ketable security and a loan (with a jump). Furthermore, we consider an investment horizon
of T = 10 years and assume that Total capital is raised at the xed rate of c = 0:415. We
assume that the intensity of the Poisson process, which counts the number of jumps of size
0.05, is  = k = 0:4. The rest of the parameters of the simulation are
c2 = 0:25, a = 0:0112, b = 0:0332, k1 = 0:00112,
1 = 0:11, 1 = 0:05, 2 = 0:22 and 2 = 0:1
with initial conditions
C(0) = 1, CT2(0) = 0:45, r(0) = 0:09, X(0) = 2:95, Y (0) = 2:8,
(0) = 0:08, T1(0) = 0:06 and l(0) = 0:03.
In Figure 6.1 we present an approximate solution of Problem 5.1 by simulating the approxi-
mate optimal proportions of capital to invest in the bank's assets. The approximate optimal
capital allocation strategy depicted in Figure 6.1 leads to the capital adequacy ratios (rep-
resented by the solid curves) in Figures 6.3-6.5. We note that by diversifying its TNRWAs
according to the approximate optimal capital allocation strategy illustrated by Figure 6.1,
the bank maintains its CAR and Tier 1 Ratio in such a manner that they are above their
minimum Basel III-prescribed levels. By Basel III standards, the bank is strongly capital-
ized, and guaranteed the ability to sustain unexpected losses. However, the value of the
Leverage Ratio falls below its minimum predescribed level. This high leverage or low level
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of the Leverage Ratio can be remedied by increasing the rate at which Tier 1 capital is raised.
We note that compared to the diusion model of Muller and Witbooi [78], the levels of our
jump model's CAR and Tier 1 Ratio are improved by the jump. This is also the case for the
Leverage Ratio of the jump model.
In the next section we will derive a formula for the TNRWAs at constant (minimum) Leverage
Ratio value. This formula ensures that the bank's Leverage Ratio satises the Basel III
minimum requirement on the entire investment period [0; T ]. A similar approach was followed
by Muller and Witbooi [78]. In [78] the authors derive a TNRWAs formula at constant
(minimum) CAR value. The TNRWAs formula at constant (minimum) CAR value of [78]
ensures that the bank is adequately capitilized to absorb unexpected losses at all times.
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Figure 6.1: A simulation of the approximate optimal proportions S, r and L of Total
capital invested respectively in the marketable security, treasury and loan.
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Figure 6.2: A simulation of the total non-
risk-weighted and risk-weighted assets X
and Y , given a constant stream of capital
inow.
0 2 4 6 8 10
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
0.25
0.3
0.35
0.4
Time in years
 
 
CAR (jump model)
CAR (proxy)
Figure 6.3: A simulation of the Total
Capital Ratio , given a constant stream
of capital inow.
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Figure 6.4: A simulation of the Tier 1 Ra-
tio T1, given a constant stream of capital
inow.
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Figure 6.5: A simulation of the Leverage
Ratio l, given a constant stream of cap-
ital inow.
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6.3 Deriving and simulating the asset portfolio at con-
stant (minimum) Leverage Ratio value
We now set out to modify the TNRWAs formula of Problem 5.1 in such a way as to maintain
the Leverage Ratio at a constant rate of 3%. To this end we need to have the Tier 1
capital model CT1(t) to be stochastic, and in fact include a jump. We assume that both
the stochastic term and jump are suciently small in order to use the solution of Problem
5.1 as a reasonable approximation. The actual form of CT1(t) is deduced from the identity
CT1(t) = 0:03X(t). The formula for the TNRWAs is presented in the remark below.
Remark 6.1. At time t the dynamics of the TNRWAs, X^(t), of the bank investing its capital
according to the optimal investment strategy from Problem 5.1 and, in addition, maintains
its Leverage Ratio at 3%, can be written as
dX^(t) = f1:03[X(t)r(t) + S(t)(11 + 22r2) + L(t)L(T   t; r(t))2r]
+ 0:03c(t) + c2(t)gdt+ 1:03S(t)1dWS(t) + 1:03(S(t)2r
+ L(t)L(T   t; r(t)))dWr(t) + 1:03L(t)dK(t): (6.6)
To obtain the modied TNRWAs formula in Eq.(6.6), we dierentiate both sides of the
identity CT1(t) = 0:03X(t) and get dCT1(t) = 0:03dX(t), which is equivalent to
dCT1(t) = 0:03r(t)
dS0(t)
S0(t)
+ 0:03S(t)
dS(t)
S(t)
+ 0:03L(t)
dL(t)
L(t ) + 0:03dC(t): (6.7)
Replacing the left hand side of Eq.(6.7) by the right hand side of Eq.(6.3), i.e., by (c(t)  
c2(t))dt, we can write
(c(t)  c2(t))dt = 0:03r(t)dS0(t)
S0(t)
+ 0:03S(t)
dS(t)
S(t)
+ 0:03L(t)
dL(t)
L(t ) + 0:03dC(t)
and obtain the following form for c(t)dt:
c(t)dt = 0:03r(t)
dS0(t)
S0(t)
+ 0:03S(t)
dS(t)
S(t)
+ 0:03L(t)
dL(t)
L(t ) + 0:03dC(t) + c2(t)dt:
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Substituting this expression as the dC(t) term in Eq.(5.7), we obtain
dX^(t) = r(t)
dS0(t)
S0(t)
+ S(t)
dS(t)
S(t)
+ L(t)
dL(t)
L(t )
+ 0:03r(t)
dS0(t)
S0(t)
+ 0:03S(t)
dS(t)
S(t)
+ 0:03L(t)
dL(t)
L(t ) + 0:03dC(t) + c2(t)dt
= 1:03r(t)
dS0(t)
S0(t)
+ 1:03S(t)
dS(t)
S(t)
+ 1:03L(t)
dL(t)
L(t ) + 0:03dC(t) + c2(t)dt:
This expression can be simplied to take the form
dX^(t) = f1:03[r(t)r(t) + S(t)(r(t) + 11 + 22r2) + L(t)r(t) + L(T   t; r(t))2r]
+ 0:03c(t) + c2(t)gdt+ 1:03S(t)1dWS(t) + 1:03(S(t)2r
+ L(t)L(T   t; r(t)))dWr(t) + 1:03L(t)dK(t):
Since r(t)+ S(t)+ L(t) = X(t), the above expression can be rewritten to take the form of
the asserted expression.
We now characterize the behaviours of the modied TNRWAs formula and the controlled
version of the Tier 1 capital needed to maintain the Leverage Ratio at 3%. The simulation
is still based on the parameters and initial of the simulation study of the previous section.
We consider the additional initial condition X^(0) = 2:95 for the modied TNRWAs.
We note that in order to maintain the Leverage Ratio at 3%, the value of the modied
TNRWAs must be slightly lower than when the Leverage Ratio is not maintained at Basel
III's minimum prescribed level. The amounts of Tier 1 capital needed to maintain the
Leverage Ratio at 3% is considerably higher than for the Leverage Ratio corresponding to
the original deterministic Tier 1 capital model.
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Figure 6.6: A simulation of the Tier 1 cap-
ital CT1, required to maintain the Lever-
age Ratio at 3%.
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Figure 6.7: A simulation of the modied
total non-risk-weighted assets X^, required
to maintain the Leverage Ratio at 3%.
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Chapter 7
The liquidity ratios of the
jump-diusion banking model
We now derive the formulae of the liquidity ratios in terms of the proxy to the solution of
Problem 5.1. We present a numerical example of the behaviour of the ratios under the proxy.
As in the previous chapter, we compare numerically the levels of our jump-diusion banking
model with the Brownian motions banking model of Muller and Witbooi [78] in terms of
liquidity ratio performance where applicable. We will refer to the Basel documents [11, 12]
in this chapter.
7.1 Deriving the liquidity ratios
In this section we derive the formulae for the bank's liquidity ratios which incorporate the
proxy to the solution of Problem 5.1. In order to derive the model of the LCR, we require
formulae for the SHQLAs and TNCOs, while we need formulae for the AASF and RASF
when deriving the NSFR. We will derive expressions for these quantities here. We give
detailed proofs of Propositions 7.1-7.2, for which we refer to the books Oksendal [80] and
Oksendal and Sulem [81].
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We assume that the dynamics of the SHQLAs can at time t be described by the SDE
dHQ(t) = 1:0 r(t)dS0(t)
S0(t)
+ 0:85 S(t)dS(t)
S(t)
= [r(t)r(t) + 0:85S(t)(r(t) + 11 + 2
2
r2)]dt+ 0:85S(t)1dWS(t)
+ 0:85S(t)2rdWr(t): (7.1)
Above, 1.0 and 0.85 are the risk factors associated with Level 1 (the treasury) and Level 2
(the marketable security) assets respectively under Basel III (see [11]).
If we assume that the total expected cash outows of the bank are comprised of secured
funding backed by Level 1 and Level 2 assets, with the dynamics of the secured funding
backed by Level 1 and Level 2 assets respectively given by the equations
dfS1(t)
fS1(t)
= S1dt+ S1dWS1(t) (7.2)
and
dfS2(t)
fS2(t)
= S2dt+ S2dWS2(t); (7.3)
then the total expected cash outows can be modelled by the equation
dOC(t) = 0 dfS1(t)
fS1(t)
+ 0:15 dfS2(t)
fS2(t)
= 0:15S2dt+ 0:15S2dWS2(t): (7.4)
In the above dynamics S1 , S1 , S2 and S2 are positive constants while WS1 and WS2 de-
note two independent one-dimensional standard Brownian motions. The weights 0 and 0.15
represent run-o factors associated with secured funding backed by respectively Level 1 and
2 assets under Basel III (see [11]).
If we now assume that the bank's total expected cash inows are comprised of maturing
secured lending backed by Level 1 and Level 2 assets as collateral, with the dynamics of the
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maturing secured lending backed Level 1 and Level 2 assets being described respectively by
the equations
dlM1(t)
lM1(t)
= M1dt+ M1dWM1(t) (7.5)
and
dlM2(t)
lM2(t)
= M2dt+ M2dWM2(t); (7.6)
then the total expected cash inows can be modelled by the equation
dIC(t) = 0 dlM1(t)
lM1(t)
+ 0:15 dlM2(t)
lM2(t)
= 0:15M2dt+ 0:15M2dWM2(t): (7.7)
The coecients M1 , M1 , M2 and M2 are positive constants while WM1 and WM2 denote
two independent one-dimensional standard Brownian motions. The weights 0 and 0.15 rep-
resent inow rates associated with maturing secured lending backed by Level 1 and Level 2
assets under Basel III (see [11]).
According to the formula for the denominator of the LCR, i.e., the TNCOs, we must consider
two cases when deriving the model of TNCOs. First, when IC(t) < 0:75OC(t), we have
ON(t) = OC(t)  IC(t). Then the equation
dON(t) = dOC(t)  dIC(t)
= 0:15(S2   M2)dt+ 0:15S2dWS2   0:15M2dWM2 (7.8)
describes the dynamics of the TNCOs of the bank. Alternatively, when IC(t)  0:75OC(t),
we have ON(t) = OC(t)  0:75OC(t) = 0:25OC(t) and the TNCOs dynamics follow the SDE
dON(t) = 0:25dOC(t)
= 0:0375S2dt+ 0:0375S2dWS2 : (7.9)
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Proposition 7.1. With the dynamics of the SHQLAs, HQ(t), given by the SDE in Eq.(7.1),
and with the dynamics of the TNCOs, ON(t), given by either Eq.(7.8) or Eq.(7.9), we can
write the dynamics of the LCR, L(t), at time t as
dL(t) =
1
ON(t)

[r(t)r(t) + 0:85S(t)(r(t) + 11 + 2
2
r2)] + 0:85S(t)1dWS(t)
+ 0:85S(t)2rdWr(t)

+HQ(t)
(
  1
O2N(t)
0:15(S2   M2)
+
1
O3N(t)

(0:15S2)
2 + (0:15M2)
2

dt
  1
O2N(t)

0:15S2dWS2   0:15M2dWM2
)
(7.10)
when IC(t) < 0:75OC(t), or
dL(t) =
1
ON(t)

[r(t)r(t) + 0:85S(t)(r(t) + 11 + 2
2
r2)] + 0:85S(t)1dWS(t)
+ 0:85S(t)2rdWr(t)

+ HQ(t)
(
  1
O2N(t)
0:0375S2 +
1
O3N(t)

0:0375S2
2
dt
  1
O2N(t)
0:0375S2dWS2
)
(7.11)
otherwise.
Proof of Proposition 7.1: In the case IC(t) < 0:75OC(t), Ito^'s Lemma applied to
(ON(t)) = g(t; ON(t)) =
1
ON (t)
gives
d(ON(t)) =
@g
@t
(t; ON(t))dt+
@g
@on
(t; ON(t))dON(t) +
1
2
@2g
@o2n
(t; ON(t))(dON(t))
2
=

  1
O2N(t)
0:15

S2   M2

+
1
O3N(t)

(0:15S2)
2 + (0:15M2)
2

dt
  1
O2N(t)

0:15S2dWS2   0:15M2dWM2

:
Let L(t) denote the LCR at time t for t 2 [0; T ]. Then by denition, we can write L(t) as
L(t) =
HQ(t)
ON(t)
= HQ(t)(ON(t)):
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We apply Ito^'s Product Rule to L(t) = HQ(t)(ON(t)) to nd an expression for dL(t) as
follows:
dL(t) = (ON(t))dHQ(t) +HQ(t)d(ON(t)) + dHQ(t)d(ON(t))
=
1
ON(t)

[r(t)r(t) + 0:85S(t)(r(t) + 11 + 2
2
r2)] + 0:85S(t)1dWS(t)
+ 0:85S(t)2rdWr(t)

+HQ(t)
(
  1
O2N(t)
0:15(S2   M2)
+
1
O3N(t)

(0:15S2)
2 + (0:15M2)
2

dt  1
O2N(t)

0:15S2dWS2   0:15M2dWM2
)
:
Alternatively, in the case IC(t)  0:75OC(t),
d(ON(t)) =
@g
@t
(t; ON(t))dt+
@g
@on
(t; ON(t))dON(t) +
1
2
@2g
@o2n
(t; ON(t))(dON(t))
2
=

  1
O2N(t)
0:0375S2 +
1
O3N(t)

0:0375S2
2
dt  1
O2N(t)
0:0375S2dWS2 :
Let L(t) denote the LCR at time t for t 2 [0; T ]. Then by denition, we can write L(t) as
L(t) =
HQ(t)
ON(t)
= HQ(t)(ON(t)):
We apply Ito^'s Product Rule to L(t) = HQ(t)(ON(t)) to nd an expression for dL(t) as
follows:
dL(t) = (ON(t))dHQ(t) +HQ(t)d(ON(t)) + dHQ(t)d(ON(t))
=
1
ON(t)

[r(t)r(t) + 0:85S(t)(r(t) + 11 + 2
2
r2)] + 0:85S(t)1dWS(t)
+ 0:85S(t)2rdWr(t)

+HQ(t)
(
  1
O2N(t)
0:0375S2 +
1
O3N(t)

0:0375S2
2
dt
  1
O2N(t)
0:0375S2dWS2
)
:
This concludes the proof.
The next step is to derive the model of the NSFR. Let us at this point introduce models
for the bank's deposits and o-balance sheet activities. We assume that the bank's deposits
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evolve according to the SDE
dD(t)
D(t)
= Ddt+ DdWD(t); (7.12)
where D and D are assumed to be positive constants and WD is a one-dimensional stan-
dard Brownian motion.
We will further assume that the bank's o-balance sheet activities can be modelled by the
equation
dO(t)
O(t)
= Odt+ OdWO(t): (7.13)
In the above dynamics O and O are positive constants and WO is another one-dimensional
standard Brownian motion.
We assume that the AASF can at time t be described by the SDE
dFA(t) = 1:0 dC(t) + 0:95 dD(t)
= (c+ 0:95D(t)D)dt+ 0:95D(t)DdWD(t); (7.14)
where 1:0 and 0:95 are the ASF factors associated with the Total capital and stable deposits
under the Basel III Accord.
Next we assume that the RASF can at time t be described by the SDE
dFR(t) = 0:05 r(t)dS0(t)
S0(t)
+ 0:15 S(t)dS(t)
S(t)
+ 0:85 L(t) dL(t)
L(t )
+ 0:05 dO(t)
O(t)
+ dC(t)
= [0:05r(t)r(t) + 0:15S(t)(r(t) + 11 + 2
2
r2) + 0:85L(t)(r(t)
+ L(T   t; r(t))2r) + 0:05O + c(t)]dt+ 0:15S(t)1dWS(t)
+ (0:15S(t)2r + 0:85L(t)L(T   t; r(t)))dWr(t) + 0:05OdWO(t)
+ 0:85L(t)dK(t); (7.15)
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where the weights 0:05, 0:15 and 0:85 are the RSF factors associated with respectively the
treasury and o-balance sheet activities, marketable security and loan under Basel III (see
[12]).
Proposition 7.2. With the dynamics of the AASF, FA(t), given by the SDE in Eq.(7.14),
and with the dynamics of the RASF, FR(t), given by Eq.(7.15), we can write the dynamics
of the NSFR, N(t), at time t as:
dN(t) =
1
FR(t)

(c+ 0:95D(t)D)dt+ 0:95D(t)DdWD(t)

+ FA(t)
(
  1
F 2R(t)

0:05r(t)r(t) + 0:15S(t)(r(t) + 11 + 2
2
r2)
+ 0:85L(t)(r(t) + L(T   t; r(t))2r) + 0:05O + c(t)

+
1
F 3R(t)

(0:15S(t)1)
2 + (0:15S(t)2r + 0:85L(t)L(T   t; r(t)))2 + (0:05O)2

dt
  1
F 2R(t)

0:15S(t)1dWS(t) + (0:15S(t)2r + 0:85L(t)L(T   t; r(t)))dWr(t)
+ 0:05OdWO(t)

+
Z
jzj<R

1
FR(t ) + (t; z; !)  
1
FR(t ) +
(t; z; !)
F 2R(t )

(dz)dt
+
Z
R

1
FR(t ) + (t; z; !)  
1
FR(t )

N(dt; dz)
)
: (7.16)
Proof of Proposition 7.2: Let dF cR(t) denote the continuous part of dFR(t). Then
dF cR(t) = [0:05r(t)r(t) + 0:15S(t)(r(t) + 11 + 2
2
r2) + 0:85L(t)(r(t)
+ L(T   t; r(t))2r) + 0:05O + c(t)]dt+ 0:15S(t)1dWS(t)
+ (0:15S(t)2r + 0:85L(t)L(T   t; r(t)))dWr(t) + 0:05OdWO(t):
By applying Ito^'s Formula to (FR(t)) = g(t; FR(t)) =
1
FR(t)
, we get
d(FR(t))
=
@g
@t
(t; FR(t))dt+
@g
@fr
(t; FR(t))dF
c
R(t) +
1
2
@2g
@f 2r
(t; FR(t))

(0:15S(t)1)
2dt
+ (0:15S(t)2r + 0:85L(t)L(T   t; r(t)))2dt+ (0:05O)2dt

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+Z
jzj<R

g(t; FR(t ) + (t; z; !))  g(t; FR(t ))  @g
@fr
(t; FR(t ))(t; z; !)

(dz)dt
+
Z
R

g(t; FR(t ) + (t; z; !))  g(t; FR(t ))

N(dt; dz)
=

  1
F 2R(t)

0:05r(t)r(t) + 0:15S(t)(r(t) + 11 + 2
2
r2)
+ 0:85L(t)(r(t) + L(T   t; r(t))2r) + 0:05O + c(t)

+
1
F 3R(t)

(0:15S(t)1)
2 + (0:15S(t)2r + 0:85L(t)L(T   t; r(t)))2 + (0:05O)2

dt
  1
F 2R(t)

0:15S(t)1dWS(t) + (0:15S(t)2r + 0:85L(t)L(T   t; r(t)))dWr(t)
+ 0:05OdWO(t)

+
Z
jzj<R

1
FR(t ) + (t; z; !)  
1
FR(t ) +
(t; z; !)
F 2R(t )

(dz)dt
+
Z
R

1
FR(t ) + (t; z; !)  
1
FR(t )

N(dt; dz):
Let N(t) denote the NSFR at time t for t 2 [0; T ]. Then by denition, we can write N(t)
as
N(t) =
FA(t)
FR(t)
= FA(t)(FR(t)):
We apply Ito^'s Product Rule to N(t) = FA(t)(FR(t)) to nd an expression for dN(t):
dN(t)
= (FR(t))dFA(t) + FA(t)d(FR(t)) + dFA(t)d(FR(t))
=
1
FR(t)

(c+ 0:95D(t)D)dt+ 0:95D(t)DdWD(t)

+ FA(t)
(
  1
F 2R(t)

0:05r(t)r(t) + 0:15S(t)(r(t) + 11 + 2
2
r2)
+ 0:85L(t)(r(t) + L(T   t; r(t))2r) + 0:05O + c(t)

+
1
F 3R(t)

(0:15S(t)1)
2 + (0:15S(t)2r + 0:85L(t)L(T   t; r(t)))2 + (0:05O)2

dt
  1
F 2R(t)

0:15S(t)1dWS(t) + (0:15S(t)2r + 0:85L(t)L(T   t; r(t)))dWr(t)
+ 0:05OdWO(t)

+
Z
jzj<R

1
FR(t ) + (t; z; !)  
1
FR(t ) +
(t; z; !)
F 2R(t )

(dz)dt
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+Z
R

1
FR(t ) + (t; z; !)  
1
FR(t )

N(dt; dz)
)
:
This concludes the proof.
7.2 A simulation study of the liquidity ratios
We now characterize the behaviour of the liquidity ratios under the proxy by means of a
numerical simulation. The simulation is based on the simulation parameters of Chapter 6.
In addition, we consider the parameters
S2 = 0:02, M2 = 0:03, S2 = 0:12, M2 = 0:15,
D = 0:06, D = 0:08, O = 0:05 and O = 0:07
and initial conditions
HQ(0) = 1, OC(0) = 1:95, IC(0) = 1, ON(0) = 0:95,
L(0) = 1:05, D(0) = 2:71, FA(0) = 2:95, FR(0) = 2:95 and N(0) = 1.
The approximate optimal capital allocation strategy depicted in Figure 6.1 leads to the
liquidity ratios in Figures 7.2 and 7.4. By following the approximate optimal strategy il-
lustrated by Figure 6.1, the bank maintains its LCR and NSFR well above their minimum
Basel III-prescribed levels over the 10-year horizon. By Basel III standards, the bank holds
enough high quality liquid assets to withstand short term stress periods over the duration of
the investment period, as the LCR satises its minimum requirement. Since the bank meets
the minimum NSFR requirement, it is also able to withstand medium-long term stress peri-
ods as it has adequate funding to support its investment practices. The jump improves the
level of the NSFR over that of its proxy much like for the capital adequacy ratios.
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Figure 7.1: A simulation of the Stock of
High Quality Liquid Assets and Total Net
Cash Outows HQ and ON , given a con-
stant stream of capital inow.
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Figure 7.2: A simulation of the Liquid-
ity Coverage Ratio L, given a constant
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FA and FR, given a constant stream of
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ow.
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Figure 7.4: A simulation of the Net Sta-
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stream of capital inow.
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Chapter 8
The jump-diusion deposit insurance
pricing model
In this chapter we derive the multi-period deposit insurance pricing method in terms of the
proxy. Our pricing method, which is based on the methodologies [29, 30] of Duan and Yu,
utilizes an asset value reset rule comparable to the typical practice of insolvency resolution
by insuring agencies. In deriving the pricing method, we will on occasion directly quote the
results from the papers [29, 30] for application. Furthermore, we employ a Monte Carlo sim-
ulation method and examine the eects of Basel III's capital standard, capital forbearance
and moral hazard on the fairly-priced deposit insurance premium rate of our model under
the same values for the forbearance parameter considered by Duan and Yu [30]. We compare
our ndings with those of Duan and Yu [30].
In addition to Duan and Yu [29, 30], we will also be referencing the papers Merton [72], Cox
and Ross [25] and Harrison and Krepps [44].
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8.1 Deriving the multi-period deposit insurance pric-
ing method
We now derive the multi-period deposit insurance pricing model. Since we want to incorpo-
rate insolvency resolution into the model, we must allow for some discrete adjustments to the
level of the TNRWAs at the points of auditing. Thus, the evolution of the TNRWAs can only
be described by Eq.(5.7) during periods between any two consecutive auditing times. Let us
denote the sequence of auditing points by t(i); i = 1 : : : n, where n is some larger integer. We
still take the assumption that the jump associated with the loan is suciently small, and that
its eect on the value of the bank's TNRWAs value can be approximated in a simple manner.
We assume that the annualized continuously compounded return of the TNRWAs over the
interval t(i  1) to t(i), can be approximated by
R(t(i))  N [R(t(i  1))(t(i)  t(i  1)); 2R(t(i  1))(t(i)  t(i  1))]: (8.1)
The variables R(t(i 1)) and R(t(i 1)), as in Duan and Yu [29], are the annualized mean
return and standard deviation of the TNRWAs returns assumed to be known at time t(i 1).
These variables are assumed to be measurable with respect to the information set generated
by the continuously compounded returns up to and including time t(i   1), which means
that they can be stochastic by being functions of past returns.
For the remainder of this chapter, we will assume that R(t(i  1)) and R(t(i  1)) can be
approximated by the following expressions:
R(t(i  1)) = X(t(i  1))r(t(i  1)) + S(t(i  1))(11 + 222r)
+ L(t(i  1))2L(T   t(i  1); r(t(i  1)))r + c
and
R(t(i  1)) = 1
2

S(t(i  1))1 + L(t(i  1))L(T   t(i  1); r(t(i  1)))
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+ S(t(i  1))2r

:
We denote the initial face value of the bank's deposits by D(0), and we assume that earned
interest is ploughed back into the deposit base. The deposits are insured and we consider
r as an applicable risk-free rate of return, with r denoting the mean or expected value of
the short-rate process r given by Eq.(5.3) over the interval [0; T ]. We assume that the level
of the bank's TNRWAs is subject to reset at the time of the audit. The insuring agent
typically arranges for a reorganization of the failing bank in the event of a failure resolution,
and then continues to provide deposit insurance coverage. The value of the TNRWAs of
the defaulting bank are reset to the level required under the Basel III capital standard.
After the TNRWAs reset, the newly reorganized bank continues to operate with deposit
insurance. This set-up is supported by the historical failure resolution experience using
either purchase-and-assumption or government-assisted-merger methods in the U.S [29, 30].
From this perspective, the deposit insurance contract is automatically renewed to cover a
new period. It can thus be viewed as a stream of single-period put options with occasional
TNRWAs value resets. The value of the TNRWAs is subject to another type of reset. Since
the shareholders of protable banks may consider withdrawing excessive capital, a ceiling is
placed on the bank's TNRWAs value. Specically, at the auditing time t(i), the TNRWAs
value reset rule can, according to Duan and Yu [30], be described by
X(t(i)) =
8>>>>><>>>>>:
quD(0)e
rt(i) if X(t(i))  quD(0)ert(i)
X(t(i)) if quD(0)ert(i) > X(t(i))  D(0)ert(i)
qlD(0)e
rt(i) if otherwise.
(8.2)
In the TNRWAs value reset rule, we dene X(t(i)) as X(t(i)) = X(t(i 1))eR(t(i))(t(i) t(i 1))
as in [29], and throughout this chapter t(0) is dened as t(0) = 0. As in [30] the parameters
ql and qu (1  ql < qu) set the upper and lower bounds for the value of the TNRWAs. The
parameter ql reects the capital standard set by the regulatory authority. The parameter qu
is a threshold level of asset-to-debt ratio. It determines the extent to which the protable
bank equity holders are willing to leave the capital with the bank before paying themselves
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cash dividends. The parameter  (0 <   ql) models capital forbearance [30].
The new Basel III capital standard calls for the Total capital in the amount equal to or
exceeding 8% of the TRWAs [10, 53, 84, 78]. This capital standard can be translated into
ql = 1:087 [30]. When the forbearance parameter  is smaller than one, the bank, if insolvent,
will not be forced to face an immediate intervention from the insuring agent provided that it
remains within the capital forbearance range [30]. Under such circumstances a bank in nan-
cial distress is still considered operational as the insuring agent guarantees the performance
of its deposit liabilities [30]. An interesting feature of the regulated deposit-taking indus-
try is failure to mark-to-market the bank's assets and liabilities immediately. An insured
bank faces a failure resolution only when the value of its TNRWAs falls below D(0)ert(i)
[29, 30]. Even though the parameter  alters the condition for triggering an TNRWAs value
reset, the reset will, if taking place, fully restore the TNRWAs value to the level dictated
by the capital standard. When capital forbearance occurs, it amounts to a breach of the
capital standard. The scenario 1   < ql, also a breach of the capital standard, should
according to [30] not be considered as capital forbearance since the bank still remains solvent.
The deposit insuring agent is required to implement a tight capital standard. This implies an
early closure of any troubled bank even if the bank is technically still solvent. Strict enforce-
ment of the capital standard implies  = ql [30]. In the single-period setting, traditionally,
the decision of closing early or granting capital forbearance is irrelevant, as depository insti-
tutions will be liquidated at the end of the period anyway. The typical adjustment made to
the deposit insurance pay-o in the single-period setting is somewhat articial and unreal-
istic [30].
The insuring agent is exposed to a stream of put option-like liabilities. The put option at
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time t(i) gives rise to a cash payment (t(i)), in an amount equal to
(t(i)) =
8><>:0 if X
(t(i))  min(; 1)D(0)ert(i)
D(0)ert(i)  X(t(i)) if otherwise:
(8.3)
According to Duan and Yu [30] we must use min(; 1) to reect the fact that even if  > 1, the
cash liability facing the insuring agent in the event of settlement is unaltered. The chances of
incurring cash payments due to the bank's future insolvency is nevertheless reduced through
the TNRWAs value reset rule. At the termination point of this multiperiod coverage,  must
by denition be set to one, regardless of its original value. Therefore, the last liability can
be written as the familiar put option pay-o expression
(T ) = Max(D(0)erT  X(T ); 0): (8.4)
We assume that the time t(i 1) value of the payment at time t(i) < T per dollar of deposits
can be priced, similar to those of the models of Merton [72] and Duan and Yu [29], to yield
I(t(i); ) = N [R(t(i  1))
p
t(i)  t(i  1)  d(t(i  1); )]
  X(t(i  1))
D(0)ert(i 1)
N [ d(t(i  1); )]; (8.5)
where N() denotes the cumulative standard normal distribution function; and
d(t(i  1); ) =
ln X(t(i 1))
D(0)ert(i 1) +
2R(t(i 1))
2
(t(i)  t(i  1))
R(t(i  1))
p
t(i)  t(i  1) :
For the cash payment at the terminal time T = t(n), its value at the preceding time point,
t(n  1), can then be computed by simply letting  = 1. Specically,
I(t(n  1); 1) = N [R(t(n  1))
p
t(n)  t(n  1)  d(t(n  1); 1)]
  X(t(n  1))
D(0)ert(n 1)
N [ d(t(n  1); 1)]: (8.6)
The formula in Eq.(8.6) is the same as that of Merton [72], whereas the formula in Eq.(8.5)
is also that of Merton [72] if  = 1 [29].
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The time t(0) value of an individual put option at time t(i) is the present value of the product
of I(t(i)) and D(0)ert(i). The present value operator can be derived by using the risk-neutral
valuation technique. Based on the ndings of Cox and Ross [25] and Harrison and Kreps
[44], we assume that the continuously compounded return on the bank's TNRWAs, under
the risk-neutralized pricing measure, distributes according to:
R(t(i))  N [(r   
2
R(t(i  1))
2
)(t(i)  t(i  1)); 2R(t(i  1))(t(i)  t(i  1))]: (8.7)
We now present the fairly-priced deposit insurance premium rate. We let n denote the
fairly-priced premium rate per period of an n-period deposit insurance coverage. The fairly-
priced premium rate, a theoretical entity, is a risk-based rate which equates the present
value of the entire stream of deposit insurance liabilities with the present value of the total
insurance levies at this premium rate [30]. According to [30] the global practise of rate-
setting by deposit insurance agents can hardly be considered as setting a fair premium rate.
Nevertheless, the fairly-priced premium rate serves as a convenient measure for the intrinsic
value of the deposit insurance coverage [30]. We follow the approach of Duan and Yu [30]
and calculate the fairly-priced premium rate per period in an n-period coverage horizon as
follows:
n =
1
nD(0)
nX
i=1
e rt(i)Et(0)[I(t(i))]; (8.8)
where Et(0)[] denotes expectation taken at time t(0) with respect to the distribution specied
in relation (8.7).
We assume that risk-taking behaviour (or moral hazard behaviour) is governed by the out-
comes of the bank's TNRWAs value, which is classied into three categories. First, if the
value of the TNRWAs is greater than the level required by the Basel III capital standard,
the bank functions normally and its portfolio risk characteristics remain unchanged. In
other words, R(t(i)) = R(t(i   1)). Second, if the bank's TNRWAs value breaches the
capital standard but is tolerated by the regulatory authority, then the moral hazard be-
haviour occurs; i.e., the bank starts to take on more risk in its portfolio. A simple way of
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modelling this eect is to force an increase on R. According to Duan and Yu [30], this
action increases the stationary standard deviation of its portfolio by 100!%. Hence we have
R(t(i)) = (1+!)
2R(t(i 1)). Lastly, once the troubled bank breaks the threshold level, we
assume that the situation becomes intolerable and the insuring agent steps in to reorganize
the bank. This results in the bank's original risk level being restored, i.e., R(t(i)) = R(t(0)).
The adjustment process can be formulated as follows [30]:
R(t(i)) =
8>>>>><>>>>>:
R(t(i  1)) if X(t(i))  qlD(0)ert(i)
(1 + !)2R(t(i  1)) if qlD(0)ert(i) > X(t(i))  D(0)ert(i)
R(t(0)) if otherwise.
(8.9)
In the above dynamic R() is indexed by time to reect its time-varying nature.
8.2 Studying the deposit insurance pricing model nu-
merically
We now perform numerical simulations with our deposit insurance pricing model to study its
implications. Using a Monte Carlo simulation method, where ten thousand sample paths are
used in every Monte Carlo calculation, we compute the fairly-priced premium rate for dif-
ferent scenarios. In particular, we study the impact of capital forbearance and moral hazard
on the fairly-priced premium rate for both the scenario where the capital standard is strictly
enforced by the regulatory authority, and the scenario where the bank faces a looser capi-
tal standard. The computations are based on the simulation parameters of Chapters 6 and 7.
We assume that auditing takes place once a year, at the end of the year, and we consider
coverage horizons of duration 5, 10 and 15 years. For the scenario where the capital standard
is strictly enforced, the parameters qu and ql must be set to 1.15 and 1.087 respectively (see
[30]). In this case  = ql = 1:087. To study the impact of a looser capital standard we
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consider the case that ql = 1:05. Three initial values of the asset-to-debt ratio are consid-
ered. These are 1.09, 1.11 and 1.13, all of which fall inside the range established by ql and qu.
Table 8.1 presents the fairly-priced premium rates corresponding to dierent coverage hori-
zons and leverage positions. The values in this table are based on the assumption that the
capital standard is strictly enforced by the regulatory authority. For a xed asset-to-debt
ratio an increase in the coverage horizon causes the premium to rise. By keeping the cover-
age horizon xed and decreasing the level of the initial leverage (increase in the value of the
initial asset-to-debt ratio X(0)=D(0)), the value of the fairly-priced premium rate drops.
Table 8.1: A comparison of the fairly-priced deposit insurance premium rates under dierent
model assumptions when the capital standard is strictly enforced, i.e.,  = ql.
 ql qu X(0) D(0) X(0)=D(0) 5 10 15
1.087 1.087 1.15 2.95 2.71 1.09 0.00429 0.00637 0.00666
2.66 1.11 0.00386 0.00610 0.00646
2.61 1.13 0.00347 0.00585 0.00627
When the capital standard is not strictly enforced by the regulatory authority, the insured
bank eectively faces a looser capital requirement. Failure to enforce a higher capital stan-
dard is not exactly the same as setting a lower capital standard, because capital forbearance
is likely to encourage the risk-taking behaviour on the part of an insured bank under nancial
distress [30].
Table 8.2 highlights the eect of capital forbearance, with the forbearance parameter  equal
to 0.97, on the fairly-priced deposit insurance premium. In the computations the risk-taking
intensity parameter ! is assumed to be 0.2. For a xed initial asset-to-debt ratio an increase
in the coverage horizon leads to a rise in the premium rate. In this situation, keeping the
coverage horizon xed and reducing the level of the initial leverage (increase in X(0)=D(0))
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causes the value of the fairly-priced premium rate to fall. Recall that this behaviour was
also observed for the scenario where the capital standard is strictly enforced.
Table 8.2: A comparison of the fairly-priced deposit insurance premium rates under dierent
model assumptions when capital forbearance is present, i.e.,  < 1.
 ql qu ! X(0) D(0) X(0)=D(0) 5 10 15
0:97 1:05 1.15 0.20 2.95 2.71 1.09 0.00953 0.01204 0.01239
2.66 1.11 0.00920 0.01190 0.01231
2.61 1.13 0.00890 0.01177 0.01224
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
2.85
2.9
2.95
3
3.05
3.1
3.15
3.2
3.25
3.3
3.35
Time in years
 
 
Expected TNRWAs when D(0)=2.71
Expected TNRWAs when D(0)=2.66
Expected TNRWAs when D(0)=2.61
Figure 8.1: A simulation of the expected
TNRWAs at the auditing times when
the initial asset-to-debt ratio X(0)=D(0)
is respectively 1.09, 1.11 and 1.13, and
the capital forbearance parameter is  =
1:087.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
2.75
2.8
2.85
2.9
2.95
3
3.05
3.1
3.15
3.2
3.25
Time in years
 
 
Expected TNRWAs when D(0)=2.71
Expected TNRWAs when D(0)=2.66
Expected TNRWAs when D(0)=2.61
Figure 8.2: A simulation of the expected
TNRWAs at the auditing times when the
initial asset-to-debt ratio X(0)=D(0) is
respectively 1.09, 1.11 and 1.13, and the
capital forbearance parameter is  = 0:97.
The behaviour of our fairly-priced premium rate diers substantially from that of Duan
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and Yu [30]. The aforementioned authors employed a GARCH option pricing technique to
determine the fairly-priced deposit insurance premium rate under dierent conditions. Duan
and Yu [30] reports that their fairly priced premium rate increases with the asset-to-debt
ratio. An increase in the coverage horizon in their model causes the premium to rise or
fall depending on the initial leverage (asset-to-debt) position. When the initial leverage
is high, an increase in the coverage horizon reduces the fairly priced premium rates. The
reverse is true when the leverage is low. A longer run deposit insurance coverage has the
eect of lowering the fairly priced premium rate. If the capital standard is low relative to
the current asset-to-debt ratio, the fairly priced premium rate tends to increase with the
coverage horizon.
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Chapter 9
Pricing interest rate swaps under the
CIR dynamic
This chapter presents methods for pricing LIBOR-in-arrears and vanilla interest rate swaps
under the CIR [22] dynamic. We employ the methodology of Mallier and Alobaidi [65],
who used a Green's function approach to derive analytical expressions for the values of the
aforementioned swaps. We quote directly from the methodology of Mallier and Alobaidi [65]
here. To characterize the pricing models of [65], we contribute numerical examples based on
Monte Carlo simulation methods. In particular, we examine the eect of the value of the
xed interest rate on the prices of the LIBOR-in-arrears swap and the vanilla swap. Besides
the reference [65], other key references of this chapter are: Cox et al. [21, 22], Wilmott
[93], Due [31], Klugman [61], Mallier and Mansi [66, 67], Abramowitz and Stegun [3],
Gradshteyn and Ryzhik [41], and Buttler and Waldvogel [18].
9.1 Deriving the swap pricing methods
We now proceed to demonstrate how the swap pricing models can be derived. We consider
a general stochastic interest rate r which obeys the SDE
dr(t) = u(r; t)dt+ w(r; t)dWr(t); (9.1)
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where the coecient u(r; t) represents the drift of the interest rate process and the expression
w(r; t) in the second term of the above SDE can be thought of as its volatility. Above, Wr
still denotes the one-dimensional standard Brownian motion dened on the ltered proba-
bility space (
;F ;F(t)t0;P) of Chapter 5.
We assume that the bank's TNRWAs consist of a risk-free hedged portfolio consisting of
two bonds with dierent maturities, each of which are derivatives of the interest rate model
described by Eq.(9.1). According to Wilmott [93] the price V (r; t) of such a bond, regardless
of its maturity, follows the PDE:
@V
@t
+
1
2
w2
@2V
@r2
+ (u  w)@V
@r
  rV = 0: (9.2)
The coecient u w in Eq.(9.2) represents the risk-adjusted drift while (r; t) is known as
the market price of risk. The functional forms of u w and w will depend on the specics of
the interest rate model chosen. Many of the popular one-factor interest rate models are spe-
cial cases of the general ane mode, for which u w = a(t)  b(t)r and w =pc(t)r   d(t).
One such case is the CIR model (see [21, 22]), which is the model we will be using in this
analysis. For the aforementioned model (hereafter the CIR [22] model), u   w = %   r
and w = 
p
r, where the coecients are constants, opposed to functions as in the general
ane model.
For a bond involving a single cash ow at time t = T , Eq.(9.2) must be solved together with
the pay-o at time T . Let us denote the value of this pay-o by V0(r). If we specialize to the
CIR [22] model, and further make the transformation t = T    , so that  is the remaining
life of the bond, then Eq.(9.2) may be written as
@V
@
=
2r
2
@2V
@r2
+ (%   r)@V
@r
  rV; (9.3)
together with the condition that the pay-o at maturity V0(r) = V (r; 0) is specied at  = 0
[65]. Several authors have solved this problem using various techniques. A popular technique
is to assume that the solution has the form V (r; t) = exp[A(r; t) rB(r; t)], which Due [31]
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and Klugman [61] have shown is a solution for the general ane model. A slightly dierent
approach, which Mallier and Mansi [66, 67] have taken, is to take the Laplace transform in
time of Eq.(9.3),
V^ (p) =
Z 1
0
V ()e pd; (9.4)
and arrive at the following non-homogeneous ODE for the transform of the bond price,"
2r
2
@2
@r2
+ (%   r) @
@r
+ (p  r)
#
V^ = V0(r): (9.5)
Two linearly independent homogeneuous solutions to Eq.(9.5) are
V^1 = exp
" 
~
2
q
~2 + 2
  1
2
!
~r
#
M [2~%+ ~p  1; 2~%; ~r]; (9.6)
and
V^2 = exp
" 
~
2
q
~2 + 2
  1
2
!
~r
#
U [2~%+ ~p  1; 2~%; ~r]; (9.7)
where the transformations ~ = 

, ~% = %
2
, ~r =
2r
p
~2+2

and ~p = ( p

+ ~ ~%)(~2+2) 1=2  ~% have
been applied, and M(a; b; ~r) and U(a; b; ~r) are Kummer functions [3, 41]. Let us write r# =
~rp
~2+2
. Then using these homogeneous solutions we can construct a solution to Eq.(9.5),
V^ =
 (2~%+ ~p  1)
 (2~%)
q
~2 + 2
;

"
V^1
Z 1
~r
exp(  ~r#)~r4~% 1U [2~%+ ~p  1; 2~%; ~r]V0

r#
2

d~r
+ V^2
Z ~r
~0
exp(  ~r#)~r4~% 1M [2~%+ ~p  1; 2~%; ~r]V0

r#
2

d~r
#
; (9.8)
where the boundary conditions that we require V^ ! 0 as ~r !1 and V^~r bounded as ~r ! 0
have been imposed. The value of the option can be recovered by inverting the transform
with
V (r; ) =
1
2i
Z c+i1
c i1
V^ (r; p)epdp: (9.9)
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Here c lies to the right of all the singularities of V^ (r; p). This integral can be evaluated by
closing the contour to the left, and the value of the contour integral is 2i times the sum
of the residues contained inside the loop. Recalling that  (cz) is single-valued and analytic
over the entire complex plane, except for simple poles with residue ( 1)
nc 1
n!
at the points
z =  n
c
(n = 0; 1; 2; : : : ), we deduce that V^ has simple poles at the points ~p = 1   n   2~%,
or at p = (1  n  ~%)
q
~2 + 2  ~ ~%, and it follows that the inverse is
V =
1
 (2~%)
exp
" 
~
2
q
~2 + 2
  1
2
!
~r + ((1  ~%)
q
~2 + 2  ~ ~%)
#

1X
n=0
( 1)n
n!
e n
p
~2+2

"
M [ n; 2~%; ~r]
Z 1
~r
exp( ~r#)~r4~% 1U [ n; 2~%; ~r]V0
 
r#
2
!
d~r
+ U [ n; 2~%; ~r]
Z ~r
0
exp( ~r#)~r4~% 1M [ n; 2~%; ~r]V0
 
r#
2
!
d~r
#
: (9.10)
The above expression can be rewritten in terms of the Laguerre polynomials using the rela-
tions [3]
M [ n; 2~%; ~r] = n! (2~%)
 (2~%+ n)
L2~% 1n (~r); (9.11)
U [ n; 2~%; ~r] = ( 1)nn!L2~% 1n (~r); (9.12)
and we arrive at the simplied expression
V = exp
" 
~
2
q
~2 + 2
  1
2
!
~r + ((1  ~k)
q
~2 + 2  ~ ~%)
#

1X
n=0
n!e n
p
~2+2
 (2~%+ n)
L2~% 1n (~r)
Z 1
0
exp( ~r#)~r4~% 1L2~% 1n (~r)
 V0
 
r#
2
!
d~r: (9.13)
This expression can be further simplied using the identity [41]
1X
n=0
n!znLn(x)L

n(y)
 (n+  + 1)
=
(xyz) 

2
1  z exp

  z(x+ y)
1  z

I

2
p
xyz
1  z

; (9.14)
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where I is a Bessel function so that
V =
1
2
r ~%+
1
2 csch
 

q
~2 + 2
2
!
 exp
" 
~
2
q
~2 + 2
  1
2
  1
e
p
~2+2   1
!
~r + (2
q
~2 + 2  ~ ~%)
#

Z 1
0
~r03~% 
1
2 exp
"
 
 
~q
~2 + 2
+
1
e
p
~2+2   1
!
~r0
#
 I2~% 1
"
2
p
~r~r0
sinh
q
~2 + 2
#
V0
 
~r0
2
q
~2 + 2
!
d~r0: (9.15)
In Eq.(9.15) we have an expression for the value of a single payment bond. It can be written
using a Green's function in the form
V =
Z 1
0
G(~r; ~r0; ) ~V0(~r0)d~r0; (9.16)
with
G(~r; ~r0; ) =
1
2
~r ~%+
1
2 exp
" 
~
2
q
~2 + 2
  1
2
  1
e
p
~2+2   1
!
~r
#
 exp

2
q
~2 + 2  ~ ~%



csch

q
~2 + 2
2
 ~r03~%  12 exp
"
 
 
1
e
p
~2+2   1
+
~q
~2 + 2
!
~r0
#
 I2~% 1
"
2
p
~r~r0
sinh
q
~2 + 2
#
and where ~V0(~r) = V0(r). In Buttler and Waldvogel [18] this Green's function solution was
presented in a slightly dierent but equivalent form in the context of the valuation of callable
bonds.
In an interest rate swap, typically a payment is either made or received every six months,
with each of the payments being the same as that of an FRA. To value the swap, we can
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apply Eq.(9.16) to each of these FRAs and then sum them to arrive at a value for the swap.
In what follows, a swap will be priced from the viewpoint of a receiver, i.e., an investor that
receives xed and pays oating; the price from the viewpoint of a payer, i.e., someone who
pays xed and receives oating, is the negative of the value found here. The xed rate is
assumed to be specied a priori, and we will denote it by rf . The oating rate for each pay-
ment is determined at the \reset time". The reset time is usually earlier than the payment
time, which is the moment at which payments exchange hands. In fact, the oating rate for
each payment is usually determined at the previous payment date. One instrument where
the payment time and reset time coincide is the LIBOR-in-arrears swap.
For a LIBOR-in-arrears swap, the reset and payment dates coincide. For each payment, the
cash ow at the payment date is simply the dierence between the xed interest rate rf and
the value of the oating rate r at the time of the payment, multiplied by 1
2
since payments
are made every six months. Thus V0(r) =
rf r
2
, or
~V0(~r
0) =
1
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0
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If V0 is negative, the receiver has to pay the balance to the payer, while it is negative, the
payer must pay the receiver. Using this pay-o in the Green's function solution Eq.(9.16)
gives the following value for each of the cash ows, where it is assumed that cash ow number
i is received at a time i later:
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The integral in the above expression can be evaluated using the relationsZ 1
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; (9.19)
where M is Kummer's function and   the gamma function (see [3, 41]), giving the following
closed form expression for the value of the cash ow at time i:
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The expression above is the value of an FRA. The value of the swap is then simply the sum
of the FRA values, i.e.,
V =
X
i
Vi; (9.21)
where the value of the FRA i which occurs at time i is given by Eq.(9.20), and the sum is
over all FRAs in the swap.
We now show how to price a vanilla swap under the CIR [22] dynamic. This requires a
slightly dierent approach. Typically for such a swap, the oating rate for one payment date
is determined at the previous payment date, so that the payment and reset dates do not
99
 
 
 
 
coincide. To value a vanilla swap using the CIR [22] model, we must distinguish between
the rst FRA and subsequent FRAs. For the rst payment, which we assume takes place at
a future date 1 and which has a present value of V1, the reset date has already occurred.
Hence, we know the oating rate which will be used for the rst payment. If we denote this
rate by r1, the cash ow at 1 will be V0 =
rf r1
2
, so that the value of the rst FRA is simply
that of a zero coupon bond with principal
rf r1
2
and time until maturity of 1, which is given
by [67],
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For subsequent cash ows occuring at times i, for i > 1, we will assume that the reset date
occurs at the previous payment date, so that it occurs a time 1
2
before the payment. The
oating rate ri for the payment at i is xed at this reset date, and the cash ow at the
payment date will be V0 =
rf ri
2
. For these FRAs, we consider the xed and oating legs
separately. For the xed leg, we know that the present value is once again that of a zero
coupon bond, with time to expiration of i and principal
rf
2
, given by
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A little more work is required for the oating leg at time i. The value of this leg at the
time of the reset date, rather than at the present time, is given by a zero coupon bond, this
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time with principal   ri
2
and time until expiry of 1
2
, which is
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Next we nd the expected value of the oating leg at the present time. We know that if the
interest rate at a time i  12 in the future is ri, then this leg has a value Ui(ri) at that time,
but of course the interest rate ri is unknown at the present time. To value the oating leg,
we can again use the Green's function formula (9.16), this time with  replaced by i   12
and V0 by Ui given by Eq.(9.24), so that the present value of this leg is
V
(b)
i =
1
2
~r ~%+
1
2 exp
" 
~
2
q
~2 + 2
  1
2
  1
e
p
~2+2(i  12 )   1
!
~r
#
 exp

2
q
~2 + 2  ~ ~%



i   1
2

csch

q
~2 + 2

i   12

2

Z 1
0
~r03~% 
1
2 exp
"
 
 
1
e
p
~2+2(i  12 )   1
+
~q
~2 + 2
!
~r0
#
 I2~% 1
" p
~r~r0
sinh
q
~2 + 2
i  12
2
#
~Ui(~r
0)d~r0; (9.25)
or
V
(b)
i =  
 (4~%)
22~%+3 (2~%)
q
~2 + 2
 
~q
~2 + 2
+
1
e
p
~2+2=2   1
! 4%
 ~r ~%+ 12 exp
" 
~
2
q
~2 + 2
  1
2
  1
e
p
~2+2(i  12 )   1
!
~r
#
101
 
 
 
 
 exp

2
q
~2 + 2  ~ ~%

i

csch2~%

q
~2 + 2
4
csch

q
~2 + 2(i   12)
2

Z 1
0
~r03~%+
1
2 I2~% 1
" p
~r~r0
sinh
q
~2 + 2
i  12
2
#
 exp
"
 
 
1
2
+
1
e
p
~2+2=2   1
+
1
e
p
~2+2(i  12 )   1
+
~
2
q
~2 + 2
!
~r0
#
 M
"
4~%; 2~%;
~r0
4
 
~q
~2 + 2
+
1
e
p
~2+2=2   1
! 1
csch2

q
~2 + 2
4
#
d~r0: (9.26)
The present value of the cash ow to be received at time i is then the sum of the xed and
oating legs and is given by
V
(a)
i + V
(b)
i ; (9.27)
where V
(a)
i came from the xed leg and V
(b)
i came from the oating leg. The total Vi can
be thought of as the value of an FRA. As with the LIBOR-in-arrears swap, the value of the
vanilla swap is now simply the sum of the present values of the future cash ows, namely
V =
X
i
Vi; (9.28)
where the present value of cash ow i occuring at time i is given by Eq.(9.22) for the rst
cash ow at 1 and by Eq.(9.27) for the subsequent cash ows at 2; 3; : : : and the sum is
over all future cash ows in the swap.
9.2 Computing the value of the swaps numerically
Using Monte Carlo simulation methods, we now perform numerical simulations with the
swap pricing models. In the simulations we use ve thousand sample paths in every Monte
Carlo calculation to compute the values of the swaps for dierent scenarios. In particular,
we study the impact of the xed interest rate rf on the value of both the LIBOR-in-arrears
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swap and the vanilla swap by considering dierent values of rf .
In what follows, we assume that the Basel III compliant commercial bank which we mod-
elled in the previous banking problems enters into a LIBOR-in-arrears interest rate swap
with another bank, and a vanilla swap with a company. The bank and the company pay
xed interest rates to our bank, and in return receive oating interest rates. Our bank is the
receiver in this instance, as it receives xed rates (from the bank and company) and pays
oating rates in return. Recall that the price of a swap from the viewpoint of the payer is the
negative value of that for the receiver. We will present both of these values in the simulations.
The computations presented are based on the simulation parameters
% = 0:08,  = 0:45,  = 0:25 and  = 0:10.
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Expected floating interest rate
Figure 9.1: A simulation of the expected oating interest rate r for % = 0:08,  = 0:45,
 = 0:25 and  = 0:10.
We rst compute the value of the LIBOR-in-arrears swap. We consider the following values
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for the xed interest rate rf in the simulation: 0.07, 0.08, 0.09, 0.10 and 0.11. The initial
value of the oating interest rate r(0) will remain constant at 0.09 in all the calculations.
The length or duration of the swap is assumed to be 10 years.
For a drop in the value of the xed interest rate rf , Table 9.1 reports an increase in the price
of the LIBOR-in-arrears swap from the viewpoint of the payer. From the viewpoint of the
receiver on the other hand, Table 9.1 reports a decrease in the value of the swap with a drop
in the xed interest rate rf .
Table 9.1: A comparison of the price of the LIBOR-in-arrears swap from the viewpoints of
the payer and receiver under decreasing values of the xed interest rate rf .
r(0) rf Vpayer Vreceiver
0.09 0.09 9.906633286E+009 -9.906633286E+009
0.08 9.906633289E+009 -9.906633289E+009
0.07 9.906633291E+009 -9.906633291E+009
For a rise in the value of the xed interest rate rf , Table 9.2 reports a fall in the price of the
LIBOR-in-arrears swap from the viewpoint of the payer. From the viewpoint of the receiver
on the other hand, Table 9.2 reports an increase in the value of the swap with a rise in rf .
Table 9.2: A comparison of the price of the LIBOR-in-arrears swap from the viewpoints of
the payer and receiver under increasing values for the xed interest rate rf .
r(0) rf Vpayer Vreceiver
0.09 0.09 9.906633286E+009 -9.906633286E+009
0.10 9.906633284E+009 -9.906633284E+009
0.11 9.906633281E+009 -9.906633281E+009
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We now proceed to compute the value of the vanilla swap for dierent scenarios. In the
computations we consider xed interest rate (rf ) values of 0.07, 0.08, 0.09, 0.10, 0.11, as well
as a xed initial oating rate of r(0) = 0:09. The duration of the swap is also assumed to be
10 years. In this simulation we assume that the rst payment takes place at time 1, which
is one year after our bank enters into the swap with the company. Thus the oating interest
rate r1 for the rst payment will be the value of the oating rate r at time 1/2.
Our results reveal the following. For a fall in the value of the xed interest rate rf , Table
9.3 reports a rise in the price of the vanilla swap from the viewpoint of the payer. From
the viewpoint of the receiver on the other hand, Table 9.3 reports a fall in the value of the
vanilla swap with a fall in the value of rf .
Table 9.3: A comparison of the price of the vanilla swap from the viewpoints of the payer
and receiver under decreasing values for the xed interest rate rf .
r(0) rf Vpayer Vreceiver
0.09 0.09 2.030386586E+010 -2.030386586E+010
0.08 2.030386701E+010 -2.030386701E+010
0.07 2.030386817E+010 -2.030386817E+010
For a rise in the value of the xed interest rate rf , Table 9.4 reports a drop in the price of
the vanilla swap from the viewpoint of the payer. From the viewpoint of the receiver on the
other hand, Table 9.4 reports a rise in the value of the vanilla swap with a rise in rf .
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Table 9.4: A comparison of the price of the vanilla swap from the viewpoints of the payer
and receiver under increasing values for the xed interest rate rf .
r(0) rf Vpayer Vreceiver
0.09 0.09 2.030386586E+010 -2.030386586E+010
0.10 2.030386470E+010 -2.030386470E+010
0.11 2.030386354E+010 -2.030386354E+010
We illustrate graphically the expected cash ows of the LIBOR-in-arrears swap for xed
interest rate rf values of 0.07, 0.08, 0.09, 0.10 and 0.11 in Figure 9.2. We also present the
graphs of the expected cash ows of the vanilla swap for these rf values in Figure 9.3.
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Figure 9.2: A simulation of the expected
cash ows of the LIBOR-in-arrears swap
for xed interest rate rf values of 0.11,
0.10, 0.09, 0.08 and 0.07.
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Figure 9.3: A simulation of the expected
cash ows of the vanilla swap for xed
interest rate rf values of 0.11, 0.10, 0.09,
0.08 and 0.07.
In order to perform ve thousand iterations of the vanilla swap pricing method, with the
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computing power available to us, we resort to approximating the value of the integralZ 1
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appearing in the formula for the value of the vanilla swap with the trapezoidal rule, where
the upper limit of integration has a value of 10. Alternatively our resources allow us to use
a bigger upper limit of integration of 100. However, this means using fewer iterations of the
Monte Carlo simulation method. For two thousand iterations of the Monte Carlo method,
with an upper limit of integration of 100, we present the results pertaining to the vanilla
swap below.
Table 9.5: Another comparison of the price of the vanilla swap from the viewpoints of the
payer and receiver under decreasing values for the xed interest rate rf .
r(0) rf Vpayer Vreceiver
0.09 0.09 6.313511169E+007 -6.313511169E+007
0.08 8.261722896E+007 -8.261722896E+007
0.07 1.020993462E+008 -1.020993462E+008
We note that for the improved approximation of the integral (9.29) the value of the vanilla
swap still rises under decreasing rf values from the viewpoint of the payer, while it decreases
from the viewpoint of the receiver. Under increasing rf values we also note that the value
of the vanilla swap still drops from the point of view of the payer, while from the viewpoint
of the receiver it rises.
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Table 9.6: Another comparison of the price of the vanilla swap from the viewpoints of the
payer and receiver under increasing values for the xed interest rate rf .
r(0) rf Vpayer Vreceiver
0.09 0.09 6.313511169E+007 -6.313511169E+007
0.10 4.365299443E+007 -4.365299443E+007
0.11 2.417087716E+007 -2.417087716E+007
At the present time the computations presented in the simulations above were obtained
by exhausting the computing power available to us. The results, in principle, could be
rened further by applying more iterations on more powerful computing machines and by
also considering higher values of the upper limit of integration in the integral (9.29).
108
 
 
 
 
Chapter 10
Conclusion
This thesis presents a study of a range of related commercial banking problems in discrete
and continuous time settings. Firstly, in a continuous time setting, we study an optimization
problem that involves deriving a capital allocation strategy that maximizes the expected log-
arithmic utility of the future value of a Basel III compliant commercial bank's TNRWAs.
The bank is assumed to invest its Total capital in a stochastic interest rate nancial mar-
ket consisting of three assets, viz., a treasury, a marketable security and a loan. The loan
dynamic is assumed to be described by a jump-diusion process. Generally analytical solu-
tions to stochastic optimal control problems in the jump setting are not easily obtainable.
We propose an approximation method that exploits a similarity between the forms of the
control problems of the jump-diusion model and the diusion model obtained by removing
the jump. With the jump assumed suciently small, the approximation method replaces
the jump-diusion model with a diusion model and solves the resulting control problem
analytically. The analytical solution then serves as a proxy to the solution of the control
problem with the jump. We study a second banking problem, which is also set in contin-
uous time. In this problem we derive SDEs for the bank's capital adequacy ratios which
incorporate the proxy to the solution of the jump control problem. Using numerical simula-
tions, we monitor the performance of the capital adequacy ratios under the proxy. The third
problem is also in continuous time. Here we derive models for the bank's liquidity ratios in
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terms of the proxy, and we simulate and observe the behaviour of the liquidity ratios under
the proxy numerically. The fourth problem of this study is set in a discrete time setting.
In this particular problem we derive a multi-period deposit insurance pricing model which
incorporates the proxy, the BCBS' latest capital standard, capital forbearance and moral
hazard. The deposit insurance pricing method utilizes an asset value reset rule comparable
to the typical practice of insolvency resolution by insuring agencies. We perform numerical
analyses with our model to study the eect of the Basel III capital standard, capital forbear-
ance and moral hazard behaviour on the model's fairly-priced premium rate under dierent
coverage horizons and initial leverage (asset-to-debt) levels. In the nal problem, which is
set in continuous time, we consider xed-for-oating interest rate swaps under the CIR [22]
model. We show how analytical expressions for the values of both a LIBOR-in-arrears swap
and a vanilla swap can be derived using a Green's function approach. We present numerical
studies where we employ Monte Carlo simulation methods to compute the value of the swaps
for dierent scenarios.
We now summarize the main ndings of our study. Under the proxy, which is to diversify the
bank's TNRWAs away from the marketable security and loan and towards the treasury, the
bank maintains its CAR and Tier 1 Ratio, as well as both of the liquidity ratios well above
their Basel III prescribed minimum values. By Basel III standards the bank is considered
to be strongly capitalized and guaranteed the ability to sustain unexpected losses since both
the CAR and Tier 1 Ratio prevail above their respective minimum prescribed levels. Since
the bank also maintains its LCR well above the Basel III-prescribed minimum level, the
bank holds enough high quality liquid assets to withstand short term stress periods over the
duration of the investment period. Since the bank meets the minimum NSFR requirement,
it is classied as able to withstand medium to long term stress periods as it has adequate
funding to support its investment practices. However, the value of the Leverage Ratio falls
below its minimum predescribed level. This can be remedied by maintaining higher levels of
Tier 1 capital, which can be achieved if the rate at which Tier 1 capital is raised is increased.
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To this end, we consider the approximate optimal capital allocation strategy subject to a
constant Leverage Ratio at the minimum prescribed level. We derive a formula for the bank's
TNRWAs at constant (minimum) Leverage Ratio value and present numerical simulations
based on the modied TNRWAs formula. This TNRWAs formula ensures that the value of
the bank's Leverage Ratio always meets the Basel III minimum requirement. To construct
such a TNRWAs formula, the Tier 1 capital model is also modied. In fact, the modied
Tier 1 capital model follows an SDE with a jump. We further note that the levels of the
jump model's capital adequacy ratios and the NSFR are improved over that of the diusion
model for the set of simulation parameters considered in the thesis, and many others for
which the simulations are not presented here. Introducing a jump into a banking model thus
seems like a viable method for improving these ratios.
The deposit insurance pricing method reveals the following behaviour. When the capital
standard is strictly enforced by the regulatory authority and we x the level of the initial
leverage (asset-to-debt), an increase in the coverage horizon causes the fairly-priced premium
rate to rise. By keeping the coverage horizon xed and decreasing the level of the initial
leverage (asset-to-debt), the value of the fairly-priced premium rate drops. For the scenario
in which the bank faces a looser capital standard, we observe the same behaviour as when
the capital standard is strictly enforced.
The swap pricing methods analyzed in the nal problem of this thesis behave as follow. For
a drop in the value of the xed interest rate our simulations report a rise in the value of the
LIBOR-in-arrears swap, as well as for the value of vanilla swap, from the viewpoint of the
payer. From the viewpoint of the receiver on the other hand, the simulations report a drop
in the values of the LIBOR-in-arrears and vanilla swaps with a drop in the xed interest
rate. For a rise in the value of the xed interest rate, we observe a drop in the values of
both swaps from the viewpoint of the payer. From the viewpoint of the receiver on the other
hand, we note a rise in the values of the swaps with a rise in the xed interest rate.
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In this thesis we rely on the simulated data approach in order to model Basel III's capital
adequacy and liquidity ratios together with a multi-period deposit insurance pricing mehod.
We derive the aforementioned models based on an approximate capital allocation strategy
for optimizing an expected logarithmic utility of a future value of the bank's TNRWAs in
a jump market. This provides a means for us to monitor the bahaviour of these models
under the approximate capital allocation strategy. Other avenues related to our topic worth
exploring include optimizing the capital adequacy and liquidity ratios themselves, as well
as going beyond the simulated data approach by modelling the optimal capital adequacy
and liquidity ratios using real data sourced from e.g., the US Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation (FDIC). Both such possibilities are currently being explored independently from
this study. In addition, we are pursuing a study in which we aim to address the deposit
insurance pricing issue with explicit consideration of bankruptcy costs and closure policies,
similar to what was done in the research article Hwang et al [49]. We are considering
extending the analysis of [49] to jump markets and then calculating the deposit insurance
price numerically via Monte Carlo simulation techniques.
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